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Abstract
Objectives: Not much is known about consumer decision-making in the state Health
Insurance Marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This disser-
tation consists of three papers that explore this topic. In Paper 1, I explore how
consumers value non-financial plan attributes in their choice of Marketplace plans.
In Paper 2, I examine enrollee plan switching decisions in response to changes in the
attributes of their chosen plans over time. In Paper 3, I simulate the expected effects
of hypothetical minimum network adequacy and plan quality rating requirements on
consumer welfare.
Methods: The studies utilize discrete choice models on individual-level Marketplace
enrollment data from California, Colorado, and Washington. Paper 1 uses conditional
and mixed logit models of plan choice to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) amounts
for key non-financial attributes, notably provider network size and plan quality rat-
ings. Paper 2 uses logit models to explore consumer plan switching decisions as a
function of changes in the attributes of chosen plans over time as well as choice set
and household-level characteristics. Paper 3 applies the “log-sum” approach to Paper
1’s models to calculate changes in expected consumer welfare under different policy
proposals.
Results: In Paper 1, I find that consumers are very responsive to network size and
plan quality in their choice of Marketplace plans. Individual enrollees exhibit an an-
nual WTP of $200-$300 for a 10 percentage-point (25 percentile) increase in provider
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network size and a WTP of $1,200-$2,800 for a high quality plan relative to a low qual-
ity plan. In Paper 2, I find that changes in the premium, provider network size, and
plan quality of chosen plans over time are significantly associated with the probability
that enrollees switches plans in the subsequent enrollment period in the expected di-
rections. In Paper 3, I find that minimum network adequacy restrictions may reduce
expected consumer welfare, while the welfare effects of plan quality restrictions are
more ambiguous.
Policy Implications: Policymakers should take consumer responsiveness to provider
network size and plan quality into account in their efforts to facilitate consumer
decision-making in the Marketplaces. Given the finding that plan quality is highly
valued, the implementation of quality ratings in other health exchange settings (such
as the Federally Facilitated Marketplace) could be beneficial to enrollees. Moreover,
consumer responsiveness to levels and changes in plan quality and network size could
inform insurers’ decisions to invest in these attributes to attract Marketplace en-
rollees. Policymakers should also carefully consider the unintended consequences, as
well as the balance between plan benefits and affordability, when considering the im-
plementation of requirements related to network adequacy and plan quality ratings.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Health plans sold through insurance marketplace settings have become increasingly
popular in recent years (Barnett and Vornovitsky, 2016; Cohen et al., 2018). However,
relatively little is known about enrollee decision-making in these contexts. On the
public insurance side, nearly three quarters of all Medicare beneficiaries (over 16%
of the US population) have chosen and enrolled in health plans competing in the
Medicare Advantage (managed care) and/or Medicare Part D (prescription drug plan)
markets (Jacobson et al., 2016; Hoadley et al., 2016). On the private side, small but
growing share of employers are now offering employer-sponsored insurance through
private health exchanges. Beneficiaries in these settings choose from plans offered
by different insurers with a variety of plan designs and a relatively higher degree of
plan transparency. In the midst of growing trends towards consumer choice and plan
transparency, the most prominent shift has occurred through the implementation of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplaces/Exchanges, which covered 4% of the
US population (over 12 million) in 2017.
By providing information transparency, standardizing certain plan features,
and offering support services for the choice of health insurance, the Marketplace can
assist enrollees in improving their selection of health insurance. In theory, they are
able to potentially deliver lower prices and better plan selections for enrollees by
fostering competition between private health plans on price and quality.
However, not much is currently known about enrollee decision-making in the
state Health Insurance Marketplaces established by the ACA. The ACA Marketplace
differs from other insurance exchange settings with respect to its population, plan
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standardization requirements, and the degree of choice available to enrollees.
In this three-paper dissertation, I address three research questions related to
consumer decision-making in the ACA Health Insurance Marketplaces. First, how do
enrollees value different plan attributes on the Marketplace? Second, how to changes
to chosen plans and the available choice set affect enrollees’ subsequent plan switching
decisions? Third, how might policies that regulate provider network size and plan
quality ratings impact consumer welfare?
In the first paper (Chapter 2), I examine how Marketplace enrollees value
different plan attributes in their choice of plans. Specifically, I estimate consumer
willingness-to-pay (WTP) amounts for key non-financial attributes, notably provider
network size and plan quality ratings. Not much is currently known about how en-
rollees value the non-financial attributes of their health insurance plans in the context
of the ACA Marketplaces. I run conditional and mixed logit models of plan choice
using individual-level enrollment data from California, Colorado, and Washington. In
addition, I run stratifications by enrollment channel, choice set size, and newness of
enrollment to explore the potential heterogeneity in WTP valuations across different
consumer choice set experiences.
In the second paper (Chapter 3), I examine how changes in the plan attributes
of chosen plans may affect enrollees’ subsequent decisions to switch plans or disen-
roll from California’s Marketplace. Though plan switching rates remain quite high
among returning Marketplace enrollees relative to other insured populations, not
much is known about the specific plan and choice set level factors contributing to
these switching decisions. Using logit models, I estimate Marketplace re-enrollment
and plan switching (conditional on re-enrollment) as a function of changes in the plan
attributes of chosen plans (with a focus on changes in network size, plan quality, and
premium) as well as choice set and household-level characteristics.
In the third paper (Chapter 4), I simulate the expected effects of hypothetical
2
minimum network adequacy and plan quality rating requirements on consumer welfare
in the Marketplaces. Minimum network adequacy and plan quality requirements
have been considered by policymakers as ways to ensure adequate access to care
and standards of care to consumers in the Marketplace. However, it is unclear how
consumer welfare on net would be affected by these policies when balanced against
potential additional costs to enrollees. Using mixed logit plan attribute valuation
estimates from the first paper, I simulate the effects of two minimum network size
requirements (to cover at least 10% and 20% of all regional physicians) and a plan
quality requirement for plans to have a quality rating exceeding two stars (out of five).
I use the “log-sum” approach to calculate changes in expected consumer welfare due
to the changes in the choice sets consumers face under hypothetical these policy
proposals.
Together, these three papers provide an empirical analysis of consumer dy-
namics in the Health Insurance Marketplace. At the conclusion of this dissertation
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Chapter 2: Health Plan Choice and the
Valuation of Plan Attributes in the ACA
Marketplaces∗
Abstract
Not much is known about how consumers value the non-financial attributes of
health insurance plans. Using individual-level enrollment data from the Cal-
ifornia, Colorado, and Washington Health Insurance Exchanges/Marketplaces
established by the Affordable Care Act, I examine how enrollees value provider
network size and plan quality using conditional and mixed logit plan choice
models. Overall, health plan choices by consumers are very responsive to
network size and plan quality. Individuals have an annual willingness-to-pay
(WTP) of $200-$300 for a 10 percentage-point (25 percentile) increase in net-
work size, and a WTP of $1,200-$2,800 for a high quality plan (4-5 stars)
relative to a low quality plan (1-2 stars). Moreover, consumers who are newly
enrolled, face smaller choice sets, or make their enrollment decisions without a
Navigator tend to be even more responsive to these plan attributes.
∗I wish to thank Ben Sommers, Matt Eisenberg, and especially my advisor Brad Herring for
helpful comments and feedback. I also wish to thank conference participants at the American
Society of Health Economists and AcademyHealth annual meetings as well as seminar participants
at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Congressional Budget Office, US Treasury (Office
of Tax Analysis), and Johns Hopkins for their suggestions and comments.
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1 Introduction
Health plans sold through insurance marketplace settings have covered a significant
and growing share of the US population in recent years (Barnett and Vornovitsky,
2016; Cohen et al., 2018), but relatively little is known about how these enrollees make
their plan choices. For instance, more employers now offer employer-sponsored insur-
ance through private health exchanges, allowing employees to select from a broader
set of choices. At the same time, almost 75% of all Medicare beneficiaries (16.3%
of the US population in total) have made plan choices in insurance marketplaces for
either Medicare Advantage (managed care) plans or Medicare Part D prescription
drug plans (Jacobson et al., 2016; Hoadley et al., 2016). Beneficiaries in both settings
choose from plans offered by a several different insurers with a variety of plan designs
and payout structures, coupled with attempts to make these plan attributes more
transparent to consumers. However, the most prominent shift has occurred through
the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Exchanges, which covered 4%
of the US population (12.2 million) in 2017.
Policymakers have seen insurance Exchanges as a way to empower consumer
choice and offer a better selection of plans. By providing information transparency,
standardizing measurement of certain plan features, and offering support services for
the choice of health insurance, the Exchanges can assist enrollees in improving their
selection of health insurance. In addition, they can potentially deliver lower prices and
a better plan selection for enrollees by fostering competition between private health
plans on price and quality. Given the selection of plans and competition on price
and quality (as the average enrollee is able to choose from over 30 plans), enrollees
should theoretically be able to better select plans that matches their insurance and
risk preferences (Polyakova, 2016).
However, not much is currently known about how enrollees value different
plan attributes in their choice of ACA Exchange plans. The need for knowledge
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on the ACA’s Exchanges, in particular, is also relevant as the context differs from
other insurance settings due to the enrollee population, plan standardization, and
generally large amount of choice available to enrollees (further described in Section 3).
The ACA’s Exchanges enrollees mostly consist of relatively lower-income individuals,
many who were previous uninsured and recently brought into the “mainstream of
health care” (DeLeire et al., 2017; McGuire, 2011).
Furthermore, with plan standardization (i.e., the metal tiers for different ac-
tuarial values) and marketplace competition limiting the extent to which plans can
compete on premiums alone, plans have increasingly begun to compete on key non-
financial attributes. Some insurers offer narrow network plans to be able to further
reduce premiums, while others have put more focus on improving plan quality ratings
at attract enrollees (Dafny et al., 2017).
The paper analyzes how enrollees make plan choices in the ACA Exchanges
by examining conditional and mixed logit plan choice models using individual-level
enrollment data from California, Colorado, and Washington for 2016. Specifically, I
explore how consumers respond to two key non-financial plan attributes in their choice
of plans: provider network size and plan quality ratings. A better understanding of
how enrollees make plan choices in the ACA marketplace and which attributes are
highly valued could help policymakers in their efforts to improve the information
conveyed on the marketplace and quantify the benefits of insurance choice.
I find that consumers are highly responsive to these two non-financial attributes
on the ACA Exchange. Individual enrollees have a willingness-to-pay (WTP) of $200-
$300 a year for a 10 percentage-point (p.p.) increase in network size (corresponding
to a 25 percentile increase in provider network size) and an annual WTP of $1,200-
$2,800 for a high quality plan relative to a low quality plan (corresponding to a shift
from the 10th to 90th percentile of plan quality). The ranges for these estimates are
due to variations in household size, tax credit amount, and cost-sharing reductions
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faced by different enrollees. Consumers who are newly enrolled, face smaller choice
sets, or are self-enrolled without the assistance from a Navigator tend to be even more
responsive to network size and plan quality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature, and Section 3 provides additional institutional context of the ACA Ex-
changes. Section 4 describes the underlying theoretical and empirical methods for
examining plan choice. Section 5 describes the data used for this study, and Section
6 describes the analysis plan and specific models used in the context of the study
data. Section 7 presents the main plan choice results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Related ACA Literature
The body of literature exploring plan choice in the context of the ACA marketplaces
is relatively limited and has chiefly focused on financial attributes of plans. To date,
there are only a couple working papers that explore individual plan choice and the
valuation of plan attributes in the ACA marketplaces. A few studies (Saltzman,
2017; Tebaldi, 2017; Abraham et al., 2017) have found rather large demand elastici-
ties and consumer responsiveness to premium (with magnitudes that are higher than
those found in other insurance contexts). Tebaldi (2017) and Saltzman (2017) then
use their respective demand estimates to then assess alternative subsidy designs and
simulate impacts of the subsidy and individual mandate policy changes, respectively.
DeLeire et al. (2017) has also found that consumers are also highly sensitive to cost-
sharing reductions (CSRs) that the ACA provides to low-income enrollees on certain
eligible plans. Overall, consumers in the ACA might be more sensitive to plan at-
tributes, notably premium, due high churning rates along with a high degree of plan
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standardization and close plan substitutes available DeLeire and Marks (2015).1
This relatively-limited literature on ACA plan choice has likely primarily fo-
cused on different “financial” plan attributes, including premium elasticities for de-
mand estimation and responses to cost-sharing, due to several data limitations. The
lack of individual level enrollment data has constrained the extent to which researchers
could explore consumer choice at the individual and household levels. Consequently,
there seems to be a significant gap in the literature regarding how enrollees make plan
choices when considering important non-financial plan attributes, including network
size and quality.
Other Contexts
It is relatively well-established that consumers value a range of different financial
attributes when choosing a health plan (Scanlon et al., 1997; Atherly et al., 2004;
Abaluck and Gruber, 2016), including the plan’s premium, deductible, and other
cost-sharing. Earlier studies (Royalty and Solomon, 1999; Feldman et al., 1989) have
estimated demand in different employer-sponsored insurance settings and generally
find that employees are fairly sensitive to plan premium costs. In the context of
employer-sponsored insurance, others have found that the more recent phenomenon
of switching employees from traditional employer-sponsored plan offerings to private
health Exchanges leads to significant consumer welfare gains due to employees be-
ing able to select from a larger set of choices and, in turn, better match their risk
preferences to the plan characteristics (Dafny et al., 2010, 2013).
Much of the related previous work exploring how consumers respond to non-
financial plan attributes has focused on focused on the Medicare Advantage, Medicare
Part D (prescription drug plans), and the Massachusetts Connector settings.2 Ben-
1Previous research has also found that enrollees in the ACA tend to be relatively more “active
shoppers” and have higher rates of plan switching than in other contexts such as employer-sponsored
insurance (ESI) and Medicare Part D prescription drug plans.
2The Massachusetts Connector, established in 2006, was widely seen as the predecessor to the
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eficiaries in Medicare Advantage managed care plans were found to be responsive
not only to premiums and cost-sharing, but also to the quality of care under a plan,
freedom of referral, and (in particular) plan quality star ratings (Buchmueller, 2006;
Darden and McCarthy, 2015).
Ericson and Starc (2015) found that consumers on the Massachusetts Connec-
tor have a willingness-to-pay (WTP) of $600-1,400 for the broadest hospital network
relative to the narrowest network available to them. They also examine how product
standardization affects plan choice and find that consumers chose more generous plans
post-standardization but were not more price sensitive post-standardization (Ericson
and Starc, 2016). Consumers also more likely to respond to a “cheapest plan heuris-
tic” (Ericson and Starc, 2012) by being more likely to choose the lowest premium
plan available after controlling for other attributes.
Contributions
This paper makes several contributions to the understanding of plan choice in the
ACA. While prior studies mainly focused on how consumers choose plans with respect
to premiums, this study aims to address a gap in understanding with respect to how
consumers respond to non-financial plan attributes, notably network size and plan
quality. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to specifically explore how consumers
consider non-financial attributes in their choice of ACA plans. It is the only study, to
my knowledge, exploring plan quality ratings in plan choice and one of perhaps two
studies (working papers) exploring provider networks in the context of plan choice in
the ACA (Sen and DeLeire, 2018; Tebaldi and Cuesta, 2018).
In addition, this study is one of only a handful of studies that leverages in-
dividual enrollment data from the ACA Exchanges to explore plan choice decisions
in-depth. Relative to the most related prior studies, this paper uses newer state-based
ACA state-based marketplaces, though there are some key differences between the two.
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Exchange data from more states, with individual level enrollment data from Califor-
nia, Washington, and Colorado. The use of this data to answer these open questions
can shed light on previously unexplored decision-making factors.
3 The Context of the ACA
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, established
private health insurance Exchange at the state level (and began operations in the 2014
enrollment period).3 These Exchanges were established to facilitate the regulation of
the individual health insurance market, to sell qualified health plans through a web
based portal, and to subsidize plan premiums and costs with respect to enrollee
income.4 Twelve states (including those explored in this paper) run their own state-
based health benefits Exchanges called State-Based Marketplaces (SBM), while the
rest of the states use the Federally-Facilitated Marketplace (FFM) platform.5 The
SBM states uniquely establish their own marketplaces, websites, insurer negotiations,
and requirements for plans to be sold on-Exchange.6
ACA plans are standardized with respect to actuarial value (the average pro-
portion of the cost of care that the health plan would pay), with plans sorted into
five “metal tiers”, or actuarial value levels: Catastrophic, Bronze, Silver, Gold, and
Platinum respectively corresponding to <60%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% actuarial
value.7 The premium and cost-sharing subsidies are applied on a sliding scale for
3They were established primarily to provide affordable individual market plans to those where
were ineligible for reasonably priced employer-sponsored insurance or other forms of public coverage
(Medicaid in particular).
4All Qualified Health Plans available on the Exchanges cover federally defined “essential benefit
packages.”
5kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-marketplace-enrollment
634 states use the FFM which have the federal government run their Exchange and use the
Healthcare.gov platform. The remaining states have adopted a hybrid state-partnership approach
that use the federal Healthcare.gov platform but maintain some of their own regulations with respect
to Exchange plan offerings and listings.
7Note that Catastrophic plans are only available primarily to enrollees under age 30 or (more
rarely) for people with a hardship or affordability exemption (if their employer-based or Marketplace
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families and individuals with income up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).
Advanced Premium Tax Credits (APTC, or “tax credits”) are available for those
within 100-400% of the FPL and ensure that consumers spend no more than a cer-
tain percentage of their income on their health insurance premium. The Appendix
provides information on how tax credits are calculated. Cost-Sharing Reductions
(CSR) are eligible to those within 100-250% FPL. In addition to receiving tax credit
subsidies, eligible consumers also receive plans with lower cost-sharing requirements
(lower deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and/or maximum out-of-pocket costs)
applied to Silver plans.
One institutional difference among SBM states is that some states (e.g., Cali-
fornia) operate through an “active purchaser” model while others (e.g., Colorado and
Washington) operate through a “clearinghouse” model.8,9 Additionally, the markets
have different decision support tools in place to help enrollees with plan selection.
The most notable of these are ACA plan “Navigators” who assist enrollees in-person
in discussing their preferences and helping enrollees choose their plans and navigate
the Marketplace.
Provider Network and Plan Quality Information
Provider network size is generally measured as the share of physicians in a state
rating region covered in a plan’s network. Consumers do not see this direct measure
of network size when they choose between plans. Instead, they can use provider look-
up tools (“doctor finders”) along with more detailed provider directory information
insurance is deemed unaffordable).
8The clearinghouse model occurs where the SBM sets certain restrictions and thresholds (such
as premium limits within metal tiers) and allows all plans meeting the requirements to be sold
on the Exchange. In the active purchasing model, the SBM actively negotiates with insurers to
select which insurers and plans are allowed to be listed on the Exchange, thereby restricting the
number of plans that might otherwise be listed in Exchange for more favorable prices/benefits for
consumers. California uses the latter approach and has smaller average choice sets than Colorado
and Washington, which use the former approach.
9States with a clearinghouse model have been found to have lower adjusted average premiums
for all plans within each metal tier compared to active purchaser states (Krinn et al., 2015).
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that are provided for each plan on the SBM websites to obtain information on plan
network sizes.
Plan quality, available for California and Colorado plans, are star ratings (out
of five stars) given to each plan contract. They are calculated using clinical measure
data along with various dimensions of enrollees’ reported plan experiences.10 A five-
star plan means the health plan scored among the top plans nationwide; a three-star
rating is assigned to plans that scored in the middle, and so forth.11 Plan quality
is unavailable for some plans because the Exchange does not have enough data on
the insurer or plan from previous years with respect to the dimensions of the quality
measures. These quality measures are not themselves missing from the data, but
rather show up to enrollees as having no quality rating available when viewed on
the SBMs. It is also worth noting that plan quality ratings are only available in
a couple of SBM states and are not generally available on the Federally-Facilitated
Marketplace (FFM).12
4 Methods
I examine the choice of Exchange plans using conditional and mixed logit plan
choice models on individual-level data from the California, Washington, and Col-
10Consumers are provided an overall quality rating (“plan quality”) and individual ratings for
three major aspects of health plan performance: getting the right care, care experience, and plan
services for members. These quality measures are constructed using: a) health records of a sample
of members from each plan (checked to compare their medical care with national standards for
care and treatments that are proven to help patients and whether they got unnecessary care), b)
multiple aspects of health care quality checked by patient medical charts and billing (for issues like
proper controls for high blood pressure, lowering cholesterol, getting the right medications), and c) a
survey of members’ experiences with their providers and care along with their experiences in getting
information from the health plan’s customer service staff. While the SBMs implement their own
star ratings, the criteria and components used to generate star ratings are fairly consistent across
states.
11Information about California and Colorado’s plan quality ratings can be found
at www.coveredca.com/individuals-and-families/quality-ratings and at www.
connectforhealthco.com/faq/what-does-the-quality-rating-of-a-health-plan-indicate-3.
12As of 2016, they were available in 6 (out of 12) SBMs including CA and CO, and not available on
the FFM. As of 2018, they were available in a few more SBMs and the federal Exchange is piloting
them in VA and WI.
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orado SBMs.13 This section (Section 4) discusses the underlying empirical models,
while Sections V and VI respectively describe the data and analysis plan in more
detail.
Random Utility Model Applied to Health Plan Choice
This study’s empirical models are based on the random utility model used to derive
the conditional and mixed logit models (McFadden, 1973; Train, 2009). This overall
structure has been utilized by several other plan choice studies (Sen and DeLeire,
2018; Tebaldi, 2017). For completeness, the main points of the theoretical framework
are presented in this section. To model plan choice, suppose a decision maker i faces
J alternative plans. The utility that the decision maker obtains from choosing a
particular plan j can be decomposed into two parts: a systematic component Vij that
is dependent on a set of observable health plan attributes and a random component
εij unobserved by the outside observer.
14 Thus, an individual’s utility for each plan
can be treated as independent random variables and can be written as:
Uij = Vij + εij (1)
where Uij represents the value or utility of the j
th plan choice for the ith individual.
Assume that individuals are utility maximizers, so that the decision maker i will
choose plan j if
Uij = max(Ui1, . . . , Uij). Thus, for Yi representing a discrete choice among J alterna-
tives, the probability that the decision maker i chooses alternate j is:
πij = P (Yi = j) = P (Vij + εij > Vik + εik) = P (εik < εij + Vij − Vik) ∀k 6= j (2)
13These were the states for which I could obtain access to individual-level plan choice data.
14The distribution of the unobserved, random component could represent the effect of bounded ra-
tionality on the part of the decision maker when faced with limited information, time, and evaluation
capacity (Train, 2009).
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Assume that each εij is independently, identically distributed extreme value Type I,
so that the density for each unobserved utility component is
f(εij) = exp (−εij − exp(−εij)) (3)






so that the theoretical probabilities for i’s choice of plan j follow the equation defin-
ing the multinomial logit model (Maddala, 1986). The expected utilities Vij can be
modeled in terms of the characteristics of alternative choices rather than attributes
of individuals. If zj represents a vector of the attributes of the j
th alternative plan,




Substituting equation (5) into equation (4) then yields the conditional logistic (condi-
tional logit) model and is equivalent to the log-linear model in which the main effect
of the dependent variable is represented in terms of plan attributes zj.
The probabilities derived in Equation (4) require that the odds of choosing
choice j over alternative choice k should be independent of the choice set for every
pair (j, k) (Independence of Irrelevant Assumptions, or IIA). The alternatives can
also be modeled using a mixed logit extension of the conditional logit model which
allows for “random taste variation, correlation in unobserved factors over time, and
unrestricted substitution patterns” so that the IIA assumption can be relaxed. The
derivation of the mixed logit models from utility-maximizing behavior is similar as
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before, and the decision maker’s utility is written as:
Uij = β
′
iVij + εij (6)
The main difference is that βi is a vector of coefficients for the observable attributes Vij
of the choice that vary for each person i, representing their tastes (as opposed to being
fixed in the previous equations). Thus, the probability of choosing an alternative j








However, one cannot obtain the conditional probability in Equation 8 because βi is
unobserved. As such, the unconditional choice probability is utilized. This is the









which is the probability for a mixed logit specification.15 The random coefficient
for each individual represents the variations in tastes related to the relevant plan
attribute.
Empirical Analysis of Health Plan Choice
As indicated above, a conditional logistic regression (conditional logit) can be used
to explore consumers’ relative valuation of plan attributes based on an underlying
random utility model. The specification for the conditional logit model in this setting
of health plan choice is:
Logit(Planij) = X
′
ijβ + S + B + εij (9)
15The normal distribution of the coefficients is typically assumed and used in the related literature.
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with i, j indexing person and plan, respectively. X is a vector of observable plan
attributes (e.g. plan quality, premium), S is a set of enrollee fixed effects (included
in the conditional logit model by definition), and B is a set of insurer brand fixed
effects.16 The dependent variable is the log odds (or the logit of the probability) for
whether plan j was chosen by person i. The inclusion of insurer brand fixed effects
account for unobserved plan characteristics that might be correlated to the observed
plan attributes such as insurer brand reputation and other unobserved non-financial
characteristics (Ketcham et al., 2016).
All coefficients are exponentiated to be presented as odds ratios (OR). The
coefficients (for the attributes other than the premium) can also be transformed into
willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates in dollar terms by comparing the effect size to
that for the premium.17 For instance, the WTP for a 10 p.p. increase in a plan’s
network size is the increase in the net annual plan premium paid by the consumer
that would make them indifferent between choosing the original plan versus the new
plan with a 10 p.p. increase in network size. The results for the main non-financial
attributes, network size and quality, are presented in terms of WTP. The result for
the premium is also presented as an elasticity to facilitate comparisons to the prior
literature.
The mixed logit relaxes the IIA assumption and also estimates a distribution
around the relevant coefficients, allowing one to observe a range of valuations for
plan attributes of interest. The mixed logit specification in the context of health plan
16This controls for and differences out individual characteristics (with the exception of income level
and individual/family enrollment, which the models will stratify by). The model instead focuses on
within-individual differences which are of interest in this paper, namely the different choices faced
by each enrollee.




βk, βP rem are the respective model coefficients for attribute k and annual net premium. The net
premium services is a price coefficient as it is essentially the price that the consumer faces for a plan.
Dividing the coefficient of any attribute k (such as network size) by the price coefficient essentially
yields a dollar estimate (annual) for a unit change that plan attribute (10 p.p. increase in network
size). The Delta method is used to construct the confidence intervals in all results. A parametric





n,i(b̃n,i + βn), X
′
m,iβm, S, B, εi) (10)
with n indexing the attributes which are modeled with random coefficients and m
indexing the attributes which are modeled without random effects (plan indices not
included for concision). For variables with random coefficients, b̃n,i (normally dis-
tributed around 0) are values from the vector b̃ representing the person-level devia-
tion from the relevant overall coefficient estimated for the sample. Specifically, these
mixed logit models will be helpful in exploring the heterogeneity of WTP estimates
for network size and quality.
5 Data
The analyses of health plan choice use individual-level enrollment data for 2016 from
the from California, Washington, and Colorado Marketplaces along with additional
data from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health Insurance Exchange (HIX)
Compare on SBM plan characteristics (e.g., deductible, plan type) and from Vericred
on provider networks.18 The states’ enrollment data includes plans selected by each
enrollee (or family) along with demographic information including age, family in-
come as a percent of the federal poverty limit (FPL), Advanced Premium Tax Credit
(APTC) amount, gender, subsidy eligibility, and smoking status. These individual-
level data are then collapsed to the household level to examine household plan choice.
The three states represent a large share of total Exchange enrollees (16% of all Mar-
ketplace enrollees in 2016).
The final analytic file for this paper is constructed by merging these three
data sets (i.e., Exchange, RWJF HIX and Vericred) at the region-county level for
18The individual-level enrollment data from the SBM states were each separately obtained from the
California Health Benefits Exchange, the Washington Health Benefits Exchange, and the Colorado
Health Benefits Exchange, respectively. The HIX Compare data can be found at: www.hixcompare.
org
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each state along with some additional plan and insurer information, notably plan star
ratings from California and Colorado.19 The exclusion restrictions are shown in Table
A1 in the Appendix. The final sample has information from 1,301,841 households
(1,061,153 from California, 99,098 from Colorado, and 141,590 from Washington).
The distribution of insurer brands by state is shown in Table A2.
Plan Attributes
The plan attributes used in the analysis include both non-financial and financial
attributes. The main non-financial attributes are network size and plan quality. The
main financial attribute is the premium, while secondary financial attributes relate to
actuarial value and cost sharing (and are listed further below). The relative valuation
of the premium is critical in serving both as an important control and in forming the
basis for constructing the WTP estimates for network size and plan quality.
Provider Network Size
Provider network size for a given plan is measured as the proportion of physicians in
an area covered by that plan.20 The Vericred data lists all of the providers covered
by each plan. To calculate the provider network size for each plan, I calculate the
number of physicians in the rating region within the provider network and divide it
by the total number of physicians within the counties of the respective rating region
where that plan is actually sold (rather than the entire rating area). I create physician
network measures for each plan in the subset (if applicable) of counties in each rating
region that the plan is offered in, as not all plans sold in each region are offered in
each county within that region.21 A plan not entering into a particular set of counties
19The reason why the merge is done for each county-region as opposed to the rating region level
is because not all SBM plans offered in a region are offered in each county within that region, if
a region spans multiple counties in a state. While virtually all counties are contained completely
within a rating region, an exception is California’s Los Angeles County, which is composed of two
rating regions that together span the county.
20This distinction is made because not all plans sold in a state rating region is sold in every county
within that rating region.
21The unit of observation in the raw provider network data is either an individual physician or a
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would thus have no need to network with the providers in those counties. Since
the data provides information on both individual and group providers by specialty, I
adjust for the group size of group providers by physician specialty when constructing
the provider network size measures.22
Quality
I create a quality measure based on four categories: low quality (1-2 stars), medium
quality (3 stars), and high quality (4-5 stars), and “no quality.”23 A continuous plan
quality measure from 1-5 stars cannot be constructed because 23% of plans have “no
quality” as their plan quality rating. These cutoffs in the plan quality variable are
selected to roughly delineate the plan choices in three similarly sized categories among
plans with available quality ratings. While quality ratings are generally given at the
insurer level, some insurers have different quality ratings pertaining to different plan
types.24
Premium
The net household premium measure is calculated as the household’s total annual pre-
mium for each plan minus that household’s tax credit (based on the second-cheapest
silver plan in the region). Examples of the Marketplace website interface seen by
consumers for each of the three states are shown in Figures A5-A7. As seen in those
figures, consumers observe the net premium and cost-sharing when comparing and
choosing between plans, as the Exchange websites automatically display the net post-
tax credit premiums and applicable cost-sharing adjustments for CSRs to Silver plans
group physician practice (with the specialty denoted in both cases). The majority of physicians in
the data are listed as an individual physician. The physician groups are categorized by physician
specialty but are not given an exact group size. To address this issue, I multiply each group practice
by the average number of physicians in a group practice of that specialty from sources including
Bloniarz (2016) and Kane (2017). More physician specialty information can be found at aamc.org/
data/workforce/reports/457712/2016-specialty-databook.html
22This would confirm that my calculated adjustments to provider network sizes by multiplying
each specialty physician group by the respective specialty group size are not driving the results.
23Lin and McCarthy (2018) used this high quality plan cutoff definition.
24Some insurers may only have quality ratings for one type of plan but not another (e.g. for their
HMOs but not their PPOs).
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following from the pertinent information entered by each enrollee (e.g. income, house-
hold size). I also include indicators for the cheapest premium plans for each metal
tier.25 The effects on these heuristics (notably for the cheapest bronze and silver
plans) may give insight as to whether consumers utilize lowest premium heuristics in
their decision-making (Ericson and Starc, 2012).
Other Financial Attributes
The models control for each plan’s deductible, maximum out-of-pocket (OOP) limit,
and metal tier (actuarial value). In addition, the copayments and coinsurance for
primary care physician, inpatient facility, and outpatient physician categories are
included in the model to capture variations in cost-sharing. These represent three of
the most salient types of services, and enrollees have been shown to respond to cost-
sharing across these categories (Manning et al., 1987). I specify low and high values
of copayments and coinsurance for each of the 3 different service types and include
these in the regression models (with low coinsurance as the reference category for
each service type).
Other Non-Financial Attributes
The models also include plan network type (PPO or HMO).26 Other non-financial
plan attributes included in the models without brand fixed effects include: indicators
for whether an insurer is a regional (rather than national) operator and if an insurer
is a non-profit organization.
25Except for catastrophic plans, because tax credits cannot be used towards these plans
26“HMO” refers to both HMO and EPO plans in this paper. A very small share Exchange plans are
EPO plans. They tend to me very similar to HMOs, particularly with respect to their reimbursement




The main models use the conditional logit regression (Equation 9) to model plan
choice with insurer brand fixed effects pooled for all three states. I then estimate
models including the measures for plan quality. One reason for this is that the sample
for plan quality data only includes California and Colorado, as Washington did not
have plan quality ratings until 2017. The other reason for this is that plan quality are
given at the insurer level and thus do not vary within insurer brands; the specification
for the models with plan quality therefore cannot include brand fixed effects. Across
these two specifications, the results are relatively similar and robust as the models
contain a relatively rich set of plan attribute controls and person fixed effects (Abaluck
and Gruber, 2011).27 All models are run separately for six subsamples based on
individual versus family enrollment and by three income groups (under 250% FPL,
250-400% FPL, and over 400% FPL). The income groups are created to match the
cut-offs for CSR eligibility (up to 250% FPL) and tax credit eligibility (up to 400%
FPL) which affect the net premiums faced by enrollees.28,29
27This justification is used by Abaluck and Gruber (2011) in their analysis of plan choice among
the elderly for Medicare Part D prescription drug plans.
28Both of these cutoffs are “strict” cutoffs. CSRs and tax credit subsidies abruptly stop for
individuals over 250% and 400% FPL, respectively. Tax credits adjustments are made to account
for the difference in the actual annual income versus the income declared when an enrollee signs up
for an SBM plan, but no similar adjustments are made for CSRs. More information on CSRs can
be found at healthcare.gov/glossary/cost-sharing-reduction
29The family income brackets (FPL levels) are presented in different ways across the three states.
Washington has a continuous measure percent FPL. California has six categories of percent FPL
(under 138, 138-150, 150-200, 200-250, 250-400, and over 400% FPL). Colorado does not have an
FPL category, but I am able to construct a continuous FPL measure from the premium tax credit
formula (see Figure A1). To pool the states and have meaningful yet concise FPL measures, I
delineate the three broad income categories: under 250%, 250-400% and over 400% FPL. The 250%




I also run several stratified models to explore the heterogeneous effects of network
size, plan quality, and premium across plan choices. First, the process through which
a consumer enrolls onto the Exchange may impact their choice of plans, so I run a
set of models stratifying by the enrollment channel; i.e., if a consumer self-enrolled or
the assistance from a Navigator.30 Second, there is literature suggesting that decision
making factors may differ between new and old enrollees, and so I also stratify the
models by new versus enrollees. Third, there is a literature suggesting that enrollment
decisions may be affected by the size of one’s choice set, so I stratify by larger versus
smaller choice sets (above or below the median choice set size) (Heiss et al., 2016;
Bundorf and Szrek, 2010).31 Additionally, I interact network size with plan type to
explore how the valuation of network size varies across plan types.
I also run the models separately for each state to see if the results are relatively
consistent across states. For the individual state stratifications, I run the models
with and without plan quality. While the three state sample would be limited in
its inference to distinguish between how consumers valuations may be shaped by the
active purchasing (CA) versus clearinghouse models (CO, WA), these results shed
some light on the variation in the valuations of plan attributes across the two models.
Identification and Robustness Checks
I also conduct two sets of robustness checks for the main model. The first set of robust-
ness checks deals with identification issues. The primary identification assumption
for the conditional logit plan choice models is that unobserved plan characteristics
are uncorrelated with plan attributes, with premiums in particular. However, plan
premiums and other attributes may be endogenous due to unobserved demand fac-
30The use of plan navigators is the main source of assisted enrollment.
31Consumers who face more choices may more strongly rely on price heuristics (cheapest bronze
or silver plans) when they are “overloaded” by too many options.
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tors. The current approach already controls for a rich set of observed information
from the perspective of the consumer when comparing across respective plans, which
has been utilized in related plan choice literature (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011; Heiss
et al., 2013). Even with the brand fixed effects specification and a rich set of controls,
premiums may still be endogenous. I therefore estimate additional models where I
instrument for plan premiums in each region with the average premium of that plan
offered in other regions in each given state.32
Another related concern is the that the IIA assumptions might not hold, par-
ticularly since individuals might not proportionally substitute across different metal
tiers with the influence of CSRs for enrollees below 250% FPL. To address this, I
estimate the main model using mixed logit regressions which are robust to the IIA
assumptions and allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the valuations of
premium and provider network size.
A second set of robustness checks operationalize plan quality and network
size in different ways to check that the results are robust to variable definitions.
For plan network size, I run models that define network size in two different ways.
First, I use a specification of region-level provider network size that includes in the
numerator and denominator all physicians in every county of each state rating region
a plan is available in, regardless of whether the plan is sold in the county or not. A
second specification does not “adjust” for group size of group providers by physician
specialty and instead treat groups and individual physicians the same in the data.33
For plan quality, I run a specification with quality as three categories (lower, higher,
unavailable) instead of the four used in the main model. Higher quality is still defined
as 4 stars or above, while lower quality is defined to be under 4 stars.
32This approach has been previous used to identify plan attribute coefficients by variations across
plans offered by the same brands in a region. However, the exclusion restriction may not necessarily
be satisfied for the instrument, as noted by Abaluck and Gruber (2011). Thus, the main models will
not use the instrumented premium (though the results are quite comparable).
33This would confirm that my calculated adjustments to provider network sizes by multiplying




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for chosen plans and all plans faced by enrollees
living in California, Colorado, and Washington who selected an Exchange plan in
2016. Table 2 shows the demographic characteristics of the sample. Consumers tend
to enroll in higher quality plans relative to the distribution of plan quality across
choice sets. Meanwhile, the average network size of chosen plans and all plans are
similar. Given that almost 70% of enrollees have income levels under 250% FPL (as
seen in Table 2), it makes sense that average net annual premiums (after APTC)
tend to be significantly lower than total (pre-APTC) annual premiums and that
consumers are disproportionately more likely to enroll into Silver plans (with the
CSRs), relative to plans in other metal tiers. Note also that a majority (62%) of
enrollees (from California) had assistance in their enrollment. Table A3 provides
more detailed information on the characteristics of chosen plans and demographics
by income bracket and individual versus family status.
Main Plan Choice Results
Table 3 shows the results of the main plan choice model with insurer brand fixed effects
pooled across all three states. The coefficients are presented here as odds ratios, while
demand elasticities are also presented for net annual plan premium. (The results are
shown as WTP estimates further below.) Consumers across all groups are negatively
responsive to premium and positively responsive to plan network size, with a premium
elasticity of around 2.6 across all groups and enrollees having around 1.2 times higher
odds of choosing a plan for a 10 percentage point increase in the plans’ provider
network size. (A 10 percentage point increase corresponds to a 25 percentile change
across the overall distribution of network size.)
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The results also point to the influence of CSRs, as enrollees under 250% FPL
are much more likely to select Silver plans (relative to Bronze plans), compared to
higher income enrollees. In addition, enrollees who do not qualify for CSRs have
2-2.7 times higher odds of choosing the cheapest bronze plan (usually the cheapest
premium plan in an enrollees’ choice set), all else equal. This suggests that they may
be at least somewhat responsive to the cheapest premium heuristic.34
Provider Network Size Results
The results for network size from both the main model and the different stratifications
are respectively shown in Figure 1 and Figures 2a-2d and presented as WTP estimates
for a 10 percentage-point increase in a plan’s provider network size (including 95%
confidence intervals).35 Figure 1 shows the coefficients for network size from the main
plan choice models in Table 3 converted into WTP estimates. Overall, individuals and
families have respective WTP ranges of $200-$320 and $370-$760 for a 10 percentage
point increase in provider network size; these increase with income, though only up
the 250% FPL level, as the WTP values are rather similar for households above 250%
FPL. For reference, these WTP ranges represent 4-7% and 6-12% of pre-APTC and
post-APTC annual premiums, respectively.
Figure 2a shows that the WTP for network size remains highly consistent when
comparing consumers who self-enrolled versus those who had assistance in enrollment
(mainly through plan navigators).36,37 On one hand, consumers going through assisted
34The main exception is for households that qualify to enroll in Catastrophic plans. However,
ACA premium tax credit subsidies cannot be used towards Catastrophic plans. So, the Catastrophic
(rather than Bronze) plans might have the lowest premiums for some consumers on the upper end
of the income distribution across all enrollees.
35Unless otherwise noted, all coefficients from results tables henceforth have been transformed
into WTP values.
36Assisted enrollment mainly consists of the use of either an insurance navigator or an insurance
agent. The results for enrollees who used a plan navigator are very similar to those for the more
general “assisted” enrollment group. A higher proportion of lower income enrollees used assisted
enrollment, relative to relatively higher income enrollees.
37The six categories available in the data are: certified enrollment counselor (plan navigator),
certified insurance agent, certified plan-based enroller, county eligibility worker, service center rep-
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enrollment might not be able to browse provider network size proxies (provider look
up tools and directories) as freely as the self-enrolled could. On the other hand,
navigators and insurance agents might be able to take into account the enrollees’
network size or provider preferences and refer enrollees to a subset of plans they may
be more interested in.
In contrast, new enrollees have much higher WTP values for network size than
returning enrollees, shown in Figure 2b. This makes sense in light of previous research
showing that returning enrollees may experience plan inertia (or plan switching costs)
and inattention with respect to changes in the attributes of their previously selected
plan and other plans in their choice set (Heiss et al., 2016; Handel and Kolstad, 2015).
A similar pattern is observed when the results are stratified by the size of
the choice set, shown in Figure 2c. Enrollees facing smaller choice sets (under 31
plans, the median number of choices) tend to have significantly larger WTP values
for network size compared to those who face larger (above median) choice sets. This
could be due to the additional search costs required to browse through a larger choice
coupled with the added effort needed to explore provider network size (unlike other
directly labeled attributes like premium and plan quality).
Figure 2d shows the WTP results for a model that includes a network size-plan
type interaction term to explore how enrollees value network size differentially across
HMOs versus PPOs. In general, enrollees have a significant valuation of network size
for both PPO and HMO plans, with the exception of PPO network size for enrollees
over 400% FPL. Enrollees under 250% FPL value network size for HMO and PPO
plans similarly. However, those over 250% FPL have a significantly higher valuation
for HMO network size related to PPO plan network size. These results make sense
given that a larger network size would be relatively more valuable for an HMO plan,




Table 4 presents the premium, plan quality, and network size results for the plan
choice model with plan quality for California and Colorado combined (as Washington
did not have quality ratings in 2016). The full set of results for this model are
shown in Table A4.38 Figures 3 and 4a-4c respectively show the WTP estimates for
plan quality from the main plan quality model and additional stratifications, focusing
primarily on the WTP for high quality plans (4-5 stars) relative to low quality plans
(1-2 stars). For reference, the WTP coefficients for all plan quality categories (high,
medium, and no quality plans) relative to low quality plans are displayed side by side
in Table A5.
Across all models and all stratified groups, enrollees are significantly more likely
to pick high quality plans (4-5 stars) relative to low quality plans (1-2 stars). As seen
in Figure 3, enrollees have a valuation for high quality plans of between $1,200-$2,800
a year relative to low quality plans. For context, this estimate represents around
24-40% of an enrollee’s annual premium for an approximate increase from the 10th
percentile to the 90th percentile of the distribution of plan quality.39 In addition,
consumers also exhibit significantly positive WTP for medium quality plans relative
to low quality plans, while the preference for unavailable versus low quality plans
are more mixed; see Table A5). As with network size, families and higher income
households have higher WTP values for plan quality.
The enrollment channel stratifications in Figure 4a indicate that self-enrolled
consumers (in California) are more responsive to plan quality than those who had
assistance in enrollment. This is in contrast to the similarity in WTP for network size
across these two groups. Self-enrollees may give more weight to plan quality ratings
38The other coefficients not present in Table 4 from the models with plan quality are otherwise
consistent with those of the main models with brand fixed effects from Table 3.
39This is assuming that plans with no quality rating are ranked in between low and high quality
plan.
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as signals for their potential plan experience, unlike assisted enrollees whose plan
navigators may provide additional insight on the experiences with different insurers.
Similarly, new enrollees have higher WTP for plan quality compared to return-
ing enrollees, shown in Figure 4b. Plan quality may be more salient for new enrollees,
who are for the most part necessarily actively shopping on the Exchange, in contrast
to returning enrollees who might not experience plan inertia given their default plan
choice from the previous enrollment. On the other hand, there is a less discernible
pattern of differences in responsiveness to plan quality for enrollees facing smaller
versus larger choice sets, as seen in Figure 4c. This stands in contrast to the finding
that enrollees facing smaller choice sets are relatively more responsive to network size.
Across all stratifications, plan quality WTP estimates are both higher and
more consistently significant compared to those found in prior studies on plan quality
(Kolstad and Chernew, 2009). One possible explanation for this is that the plan
quality ratings are saliently displayed in the online Exchange websites for the two
states examined here.40 Another possibility is that consumers may have become
more familiar with using and giving 1-5 star ratings for various online services in
recent years, as these ratings have proliferated in numerous other settings include
online shopping, restaurant reviews, and mobile phone applications.41 As consumers
become more familiar with these rating systems, they may place a greater emphasis
on star ratings in the context of health plan choices too. A third possibility is that
previous research has shown that consumers are better able to understand and utilize
health plan quality information when clear symbols (such as stars) and only the most
relevant measures are presented, as in the case of the SBMs’ aggregate plan quality
40For example, quality ratings are displayed in a somewhat bright, orange color for the California
marketplace website (Figure A5) in contrast to other plan information displayed in conventional
black and blue fonts on a white backdrop. A similar case may be true for Colorado (Figure A6),
though here the green banner on the left might also attract the viewer’s initial attention.
41Having an aversion to “low quality ratings” could also partly explain why consumers may be
willing to pay such a significant amount for non-low quality plans in this setting.
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star ratings (Taylor et al., 2016).42
Other Plan Choice Results and Robustness Checks
Premium Elasticity Results
Table 5 shows the magnitudes of these results for premium as elasticities. Across
income groups, individuals and families have elasticity ranges of 2.3-2.8 and 2.5-
3.2, respectively. Unlike the case for network size and plan quality, there are less
discernible patterns of premium responsiveness across the enrollment channel, new
vs. returning enrollee, and small vs. large choice set stratifications.
Stratifications by State
The last set of stratifications show results for the main plan choice models with and
without plan quality stratified by state in Tables A6 and A7. In the main plan
choice results by state (Table A6), network size and premium elasticity estimates are
generally in line with the pooled results, though Washington has higher premium
elasticities for enrollees above 250% FPL.
A few patterns emerge when comparing California and Colorado plan quality
model results in Table A7. While enrollees from both California and Colorado value
high quality plans over lower quality plans, the preference for high quality plans in
California is significant and increasing with income, while the effect is much smaller
(yet still significant) in Colorado without a noticeable trend across income categories.
Colorado enrollees also exhibit higher odds of choosing plans with unavailable quality
scores compared to California enrollees. One potential explanation for these discrep-
ancies is the difference in the salience of the quality information presented to enrollees
in each state. California’s SBM website presented star ratings directly next to each
plan’s premium. California also has an option of sorting plans by plan quality star
42This stands in contrast to other settings which have tried to provide detailed plan quality
information to consumers from sources such as the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers
and Systems (CAHPS).
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ratings. In contrast, plan quality on Colorado’s SBM website was not directly dis-
played in the search set in 2016. Enrollees had to click an additional link to find each
plan’s quality information.43
Robustness Checks
Overall, the results a robust to using instrumented premiums instead of actual premi-
ums in the main models. (These alternative model’s results are shown in Table A8).
Again, each plan’s premium is instrumented with the average of the plan’s premiums
from other rating regions in the same state. Similarly, the results are for the mixed
logit plan choice models are quite similar to those from the main model, as seen in
Table A9. The bottom segment of Table A9 shows the heterogeneity of the premium
and network size coefficients (exponentiated as odds ratios) for various points in the
distribution. Relatively lower income enrollees seem to have a much wider range of
their responsiveness to network size compared higher income enrollees, with respec-
tive odds ratio ranges of 1.0-1.8 and 1.2-1.3 for individuals below 250% FPL versus
those over 400% FPL.
In addition, the results are robust to alternative definitions of network size and
plan quality (the results are respectively shown in Tables A10 and A11). Specifically,
the results are similar with respect to: 1) network size measures that do not scale
up physician group practices by the average specialty group sizes and 2) network size
measures constructed at the state rating region level (rather than counties in each
rating region in which a plan is sold). Plan quality results are robust to an alternate
definition of plan quality that classifies plans into three categories (high quality: 4-5
stars, low quality: 1-3 stars, and no quality) instead of four.
43Starting in 2017, Colorado has had star ratings directly displayed for each plan on their SBM
website. Figure A6 in (the screenshot of the Colorado user interface) is from 2017, not 2016.
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8 Conclusion
Enrollees in the ACA marketplaces are quite responsive to provider network size and
plan quality ratings. Individuals have a WTP of $200-$300 for a 10 percentage point
increase in network size (equal to about 4-7% of the average annual premium) and a
WTP of $1,200-$2,800 for a high quality plan relative to a low quality plan (equal to
about 24-40% of the average annual premium). Enrollees’ valuations of plan quality
and network size are generally increasing with income and are larger for families than
for individuals. Moreover, new enrollees and enrollees facing smaller choice sets have
even higher WTP values for both network size and plan quality, likely due the fact that
these attributes are more salient to the enrollees in these circumstances. Meanwhile,
self-enrolled consumers are more responsive to plan quality (but not network size)
relative to assisted enrollment consumers.
A key limitation of this paper is that the data consists of only three states
(CA, CO, WA) in the western US. Consumers in these three states have more plans
and insurers to choose from compared to the nationwide average. While this is ad-
vantageous because it provides more detail in the trade-offs between various plan
attributes, it may limit the generalizability of the findings to the FFM marketplace
and the ACA Exchanges as a whole. However, these states covered about one sixth of
all ACA enrollees in 2016. Given the relatively good “health” of the Exchanges in the
three states in having several plans and insurers for enrollees to choose from, the re-
sults are useful in elucidating the consumer dynamics and valuations of non-financial
plan attributes under settings as intended at the ACA’s implementation.
Another limitation is that this study only uses one year of data to explore
enrollee plan choice and is therefore unable to compare how enrollees’ valuations
of plan attributes change over time. In addition, I cannot explore the relationship
between plan choice health utilization and outcomes in the absence of claims data.
Nevertheless, this study is still one of the first to use individual level ACA enrollment
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data and is unique in combining plan quality and network information with this data
to explore the responsiveness to these non-financial attributes in detail.
Despite these limitations, the results from these analyses contribute to the
broader understanding of how individuals value and make trade-offs between non-
financial plan attributes, notably provider network size and plan quality, in their
choice of plans in marketplace settings. The responsiveness to quality and network size
may also inform insurers’ decisions to invest in and compete on these plan attributes,
especially when they have to standardize essential plan features and have a more
limited ability to compete on premiums in the Exchanges. They may also be helpful to
policymakers who want to clarify the presentation of plan information and to improve
the design of the Exchange marketplace to better facilitate consumer decision-making.
Given that consumers consistently value the breadth of provider network size,
policymakers may also have a greater incentive to provide better provider network
information for marketplace plans. For example, they could provide “T-shirt sizes”
(i.e., small, medium, etc.) or other categorical measures of network size as relatively
easy-to-understand summary measures. As enrollees utilize this information when
selecting plans, it would also be especially important to make sure that plan quality
ratings are accurately measured and that provider network information (including
provider directories and provider search tools) is accurate and up to date. Moreover,
given that enrollees strongly value plan quality ratings when the information is pro-
vided, it seems that enrollees would benefit from the implementation of plan quality
ratings on the federally-facilitated marketplace and other state-based marketplaces
which currently lack them. This could help improve consumer decision-making by
providing them with useful, summarized measures of plan quality that may otherwise
be hard to assess.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
N = 46,426,138 Chosen Plans All Plans
Plan Network Attributes Mean SD Mean SD
Network Size (% of Physicians) 20% 0.12 21% 0.14
PPO 44% 0.50 35% 0.48
HMO/EPO 56% 0.50 65% 0.48
Quality Attributes*
High Quality Rating (4-5 Stars) 30% 0.46 24% 0.43
Middle Quality (3 stars) 28% 0.45 22% 0.41
Low Quality Ratings (1-2 Stars) 28% 0.45 31% 0.46
No Quality Rating 14% 0.35 23% 0.42
Financial Attributes
Total Premium, Individual $4,994 2,423 $5,531 2,941
Net Premium, Individual $2,137 1,888 $3,100 2,280
Total Premium, Family $11,094 4,505 $12,362 5,612
Net Premium, Family $3,979 3,904 $6,099 4,735
Total Premium, (Age 27 Ind.) $2,982 674 $3,308 953
Bronze 28% 0.45 31% 0.46
Silver 62% 0.49 30% 0.46
Gold 5% 0.22 23% 0.42
Platinum 3% 0.18 14% 0.35
Catastrophic** 1% 0.12 3% 0.16
Deductible (Individuals) $2,526 2,512 $2,556 2,617
Deductible (Families) $4,556 4,694 $4,886 5,126
Max OOP (Individuals) $4,334 2,091 $5,161 1,809
Max OOP (Families) $8,530 4,143 $10,402 3,491
* Plan quality rating variables only for CA, CO (N = 35,562,421)
** Catastrophic Plans are only shown when available to household
Table 2: Demographics
Under 250% FPL 68%
250-400% FPL 20%
Over 400% FPL 12%
Individual 69%
Family 31%
Assisted Enrollment (CA) 62%
Age (Head of Household) 43





Table 3: Main Plan Choice Model
DV: Odds Plan is Chosen Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Coefficients: Odds Ratios Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.889*** 0.923*** 0.948*** 0.967*** 0.945*** 0.976***
Elasticity 2.43 3.13 2.33 2.51 2.77 2.76
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Network Size (10%) 1.211*** 1.299*** 1.154*** 1.255*** 1.134*** 1.176***
(0.0028) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0088)
Silver 3.2500*** 3.4094*** 0.5330*** 0.6278*** 1.1328*** 0.7250***
(0.0834) (0.1488) (0.0123) (0.0193) (0.0316) (0.0310)
Gold 0.9115*** 1.6125*** 0.1190*** 0.1324*** 0.8762*** 0.3953***
(0.0236) (0.0743) (0.0045) (0.0066) (0.0412) (0.0286)
Platinum 1.0276 2.2948*** 0.0710*** 0.1106*** 1.3820*** 0.4072***
(0.0271) (0.1055) (0.0040) (0.0080) (0.0929) (0.0425)
Cheapest Bronze Plan 0.608*** 0.388*** 2.760*** 1.864*** 2.575*** 2.734***
(0.0276) (0.0575) (0.0446) (0.0624) (0.0417) (0.0758)
Cheapest Silver Plan 1.347*** 1.254*** 1.639*** 1.486*** 1.185*** 1.214***
(0.0077) (0.0104) (0.0192) (0.0212) (0.0190) (0.0310)
Cheapest Gold Plan 0.9465*** 0.9286*** 1.2279*** 1.1974*** 0.7147*** 0.7305***
(0.0177) (0.0266) (0.0283) (0.0315) (0.0191) (0.0300)
Cheapest Platinum Plan 0.9097*** 1.1089*** 1.1537*** 1.1638*** 0.9028*** 0.9636
(0.0182) (0.0364) (0.0319) (0.0408) (0.0250) (0.0456)
HMO 0.3681*** 0.3320*** 0.4676*** 0.4034*** 0.4539*** 0.3861***
(0.0030) (0.0045) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0101)
Deductible ($100) 0.9967*** 0.9953*** 0.9722*** 0.9823*** 0.9951*** 0.9901***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Maximum Out-of-Pocket 0.9896*** 0.9913*** 0.9877*** 0.9951*** 0.9958*** 0.9967***
($100) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Inpatient Physician
High Coinsurance 1.4126*** 1.1593*** 0.7829*** 1.2679*** 0.5392*** 0.6220***
(0.0370) (0.0639) (0.0351) (0.0731) (0.0173) (0.0291)
Low Copay 1.4402*** 1.2143*** 0.9571* 1.1915*** 0.5407*** 0.8252***
(0.0099) (0.0148) (0.0242) (0.0369) (0.0116) (0.0288)
High Copay 0.8077*** 1.0834*** 0.6039*** 0.7931*** 0.5340*** 0.7102***
(0.0144) (0.0319) (0.0126) (0.0187) (0.0100) (0.0195)
Outpatient Facility
High Coinsurance 0.5219*** 0.5119*** 0.9054** 0.5717*** 1.1353*** 0.9801
(0.0134) (0.0274) (0.0403) (0.0328) (0.0357) (0.0442)
Low Copay 0.4470*** 0.3080*** 1.3405*** 0.9934 1.2753*** 1.2230***
(0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0442) (0.0425) (0.0420) (0.0697)
High Copay 0.8120*** 0.5661*** 2.0554*** 1.5503*** 1.7410*** 1.4715***
(0.0199) (0.0212) (0.0619) (0.0536) (0.0570) (0.0773)
Primary Care
High Coinsurance 0.4949*** 0.3663*** 0.3153*** 0.3405*** 0.7623*** 0.6329***
(0.0062) (0.0093) (0.0066) (0.0097) (0.0161) (0.0229)
Low Copay 2.4874*** 2.8676*** 2.4874*** 2.5073*** 1.6130*** 1.6152***
(0.0193) (0.0434) (0.0413) (0.0595) (0.0276) (0.0425)
High Copay 2.0687*** 2.3661*** 1.8479*** 2.7996*** 1.5207*** 1.5969***
(0.0173) (0.0410) (0.0276) (0.0623) (0.0169) (0.0330)
Insurer Brand FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 22,540,279 8,510,218 5,532,135 3,379,746 4,760,561 1,764,824
Reference categories: Bronze Plans, PPO Plans, Low coinsurance (for each service type)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Plan Choice Model with Plan Quality (CA, CO)
DV: Odds Plan is Chosen Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Coefficients: Odds Ratios Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Net Premium ($100) 0.891*** 0.920*** 0.947*** 0.968*** 0.944*** 0.976***
Elasticity 1.70 3.29 2.20 2.43 2.40 2.78
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Network Size (10 p.p.) 1.14*** 1.17*** 1.19*** 1.22*** 1.13*** 1.14***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
High Quality (4-5 stars) 4.16*** 5.87*** 4.69*** 5.21*** 5.10*** 4.54***
(0.025) (0.059) (0.059) (0.080) (0.074) (0.113)
Medium Quality (3 stars) 1.28*** 3.10*** 1.74*** 2.34*** 1.22*** 1.83***
(0.016) (0.067) (0.045) (0.074) (0.028) (0.063)
Low Quality (1-2 stars) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
No Quality 1.272*** 2.001*** 0.784*** 0.870*** 0.966** 1.048*
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.029)
Observations 17,204,835 6,739,632 3,670,039 2,565,249 3,865,758 1,412,825
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full results for this model are shown in Appendix Table A4
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Figure 1: Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) for Network Size (10 p.p. increase)
Notes: These WTP results coefficients in Figures 1-2d are for a 10 percentage-point (p.p.) increase
in network size. The results in Figures 1-2d are from the model specification of Table 3. The error
bars in all figures show the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2a: WTP for Network Size by Enrollment Channel (California)
Note: Results are for the California data (where enrollment channel information was available).
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Figure 2b: WTP for Network Size for New and Returning Enrollees
Figure 2c: WTP for Network Size by Enrollee Choice Set Size
Note: “Small” vs “Large” choice sets are defined as being under vs above/equal to the median choice
set size from the sample (31 plans).
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Figure 2d: WTP for Network Size by Plan Type
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Figure 3: WTP for High Quality Plan (Relative to Low Quality Plan)
Notes: High and low quality plans respectively have 4-5 stars and 1-2 stars (out of 5). The values
in Figures 3-4c are WTP estimates for high quality plans relative to low quality plans from models
with the same specification as that of Table A4.
Figure 4a: WTP for a High Quality by Enrollment Channel (California)
Note: Results are for California (where enrollment channel information was available).
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Figure 4b: WTP for a High Quality Plan for New and Returning Enrollees
Figure 4c: WTP for a High Quality Plan by Enrollee Choice Set Size
Note: “Small” vs “Large” choice sets are respectively defined as being under vs above/equal to the
median choice set size from the sample (31 plans).
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Table 5: Premium Elasticities
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Model Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Main Model
Net Annual Premium 2.45*** 3.18*** 2.28*** 2.48*** 2.75*** 2.70***
($100)
Enrollment Channel∇
Assisted 2.65*** 3.38*** 2.31*** 2.5*** 2.70*** 3.03***
Unassisted 2.59*** 3.14*** 1.02*** 2.45*** 0.19*** 0.42***
New vs. Returning
New Enrollees 2.23*** 3.25*** 2.15*** 2.47*** 1.95*** 2.49***
Returning Enrollees 1.34*** 3.57*** 2.65*** 2.49*** 3.20*** 3.18***
By Choice Set Size∆
Small Choice Sets 0.84*** 3.10*** 2.20*** 2.56*** 2.72*** 3.15***
Large Choice Sets 1.93*** 2.13*** 2.18*** 2.12*** 2.97*** 2.68***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models control for covariates and brand FEs from Table 3
∇ Results are for the California data (where the information was available)




Advanced Premium Tax Credit (APTC) and Colorado FPL Calculations
Figure A1 below shows the relationship between the maximum out-of-pocket (OOP)
for premiums and income as a percentage of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).
Figure A1: Maximum Out-of-Pocket by Income Level
Let Si denote the premium of the second cheapest Silver plan available to enrollee
i and let M(FPLi) denote the maximum OOP (as a percent of total income) price
allowed for an enrollee as a function of their FPL. Equation 17 is used to determine
each enrollee’s tax credit amount (TC):44
Si − TC = FPLi × M(FPLi) (11)
for enrollees in 100-400% of the FPL. Note that individuals outside of this income
range do qualify to receive tax credit subsidies.
44If Si < FPLi × M(FPLi), then the TC = 0 for the enrollee, and the equality in Equation 16
would not hold However, this very rarely occurs in the data.
48
State Rating Regions
Figures A2-A4 show the state geographical rating regions for each state. Households
with similar age and smoking status characteristics will pay the same premium for
each plan within a rating region.





Exclusion Restrictions and Additional Summary Statistics
Table A1 below shows the difference exclusion restrictions and the process by which
the final plan choice analytic file is obtained.
Table A1: Exclusion Restrictions
California N Dropped % Dropped
Initial Data (Individual Level) 1,715,442
Missing County Information 1,577,160 139,346 8.12%
Family Missing Any Person ID 1,576,534 626 0.04%
Premium, CSR, or FPL Varies in Family 1,550,969 25,621 1.63%
Collapse to Family Level 1,061,153
Colorado N Dropped % Dropped
Initial Data (Individual Level) 170,846
Plan Tier Variation in Family 170,425 421 0.25%
Premium, CSR, or FPL Varies in Family 169,355 1,070 0.63%
Collapse to Family Level 99,098
Washington N Dropped % Dropped
Initial Data (Individual Level) 214,328
Missing Plan ID 209,517 4,811 2.24%
Premium, CSR, or FPL Varies in Family 201,111 8,406 4.01%
Collapse to Family Level 141,590
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Distribution of Insurers
Table A2 shows the distribution of insurers by state among both all plans and chosen
plans.
Table A2: Distribution of Insurers by State
California Colorado Washington
All Plans Chosen All Plans Chosen All Plans Chosen
Observations: 29,422,519 1,053,132 5,972,419 96,246 11,031,550 129,736
Ambetter 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.22
Blue Shield CA 0.19 0.28 0 0 0 0
Cigna 0 0 0.14 0.1 0 0
Community Health Plan 0 0 0 0 0.004 0.0003
Group Health Co-op 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.18
Humana 0 0 0.08 0.07 0 0
LA Care 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 0
Oscar 0.04 0.001 0 0 0 0
Regence 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.003
Anthem Blue Cross 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.13 0 0
BridgeSpan 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.02
Chinese Community 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0
Colorado Choice/Friday Health 0 0 0.07 0.06 0 0
Elevate/Denver Health Medical 0 0 0.04 0.002 0 0
Health Net 0.13 0.13 0 0 0 0
Kaiser 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.51 0.01 0.04
LifeWise 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.07
Molina 0.07 0.07 0 0 0.03 0.17
Premera Blue Cross 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.27
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Additional Results Tables
Table A3: Chosen Plans and Enrollee Characteristics
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Plan Characteristics N=618,441 N=254,908 N=149,544 N=100,829 N=114,522 N=42,155
Financial Attributes Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Actual Premium $1,402 1179 $2,225 2022 $3,333 1725 $5,662 3365 $4,559 2329 $10,579 4804
Premium without Tax Credit $4,922 2361 $10,754 4306 $5,590 2629 $12,027 4732 $4,624 2360 $10,919 4816
Individual Age 27 Standard Premium $2,963 632 $2,949 590 $2,987 736 $3,047 713 $3,055 857 $3,113 819
Bronze 24% 0.43 17% 0.38 44% 0.50 40% 0.49 40% 0.49 41% 0.49
Silver 70% 0.46 79% 0.41 40% 0.49 46% 0.50 32% 0.47 36% 0.48
Gold 3% 0.16 3% 0.16 8% 0.27 9% 0.29 12% 0.33 14% 0.35
Platinum 2% 0.15 2% 0.13 5% 0.21 4% 0.20 9% 0.29 8% 0.27
Catastrophic 1% 0.08 0% 0.02 3% 0.18 0% 0.05 7% 0.25 1% 0.11
Cheapest Bronze Plan in Set 0.057 0.23 0.038 0.19 0.093 0.29 0.078 0.27 0.074 0.26 0.072 0.26
Cheapest Silver Plan in Set 0.19 0.39 0.237 0.43 0.089 0.28 0.107 0.31 0.043 0.20 0.05 0.22
Cheapest Gold Plan in Set 0.006 0.08 0.007 0.08 0.017 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.016 0.13 0.018 0.13
Cheapest Platinum Plan in Set 0.006 0.08 0.006 0.08 0.013 0.11 0.012 0.11 0.015 0.12 0.014 0.12
Deductible (Individuals) $2,016 2425 $1,589 2142 $3,820 2215 $3,549 2149 $3,579 2397 $3,386 2286
Deductible (Families) $4,032 4851 $3,179 4283 $7,642 4429 $7,099 4297 $7,159 4793 $6,773 4572
Max OOP (Individuals) $3,532 1962 $3,168 1758 $6,243 694 $6,234 642 $6,152 862 $6,164 835
Max OOP (Families) $71 39.2 $63 35.2 $125 13.9 $125 12.8 $123 17.2 $123 16.7
Copayment: Primary Care Physician $46 13.3 $46 11.4 $48 17.5 $48 16.0 $44 17.9 $43 17.2
Copayment: Outpatient Physician $48 7.5 $49 7.4 $48 7.4 $50 7.2 $47 7.5 $48 7.5
Copayment: Inpatient Facility $408 195 $424 196 $427 203 $448 198 $406 195 $414 198
Coinsurance: Primary Care Physician 32% 0.10 31% 0.11 35% 0.09 35% 0.09 32% 0.09 31% 0.09
Coinsurance: Outpatient Physician 35% 0.29 30% 0.26 44% 0.35 42% 0.34 39% 0.32 37% 0.30
Coinsurance: Inpatient Facility 35% 0.30 31% 0.26 46% 0.35 44% 0.35 41% 0.32 39% 0.31
(Continued on the next page)
Table A3 (Continued): Chosen Plans and Enrollee Characteristics
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Plan Characteristics N=618,441 N=254,908 N=149,544 N=100,829 N=114,522 N=42,155
Plan Network Attributes Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Network Size (% of Physicians) 19% 0.12 19% 0.12 21% 0.12 21% 0.12 20% 0.11 22% 0.12
PPO 42% 0.49 44% 0.50 44% 0.50 50% 0.50 44% 0.50 47% 0.50
HMO 60% 0.50 56% 0.50 56% 0.50 50% 0.50 56% 0.50 53% 0.50
Financial Attributes
High Quality Rating (4-5 stars) 29% 0.46 24% 0.43 37% 0.48 33% 0.47 38% 0.49 34% 0.48
Lower Quality Ratings (1-3 stars) 56% 0.50 57% 0.50 54% 0.50 58% 0.49 54% 0.50 58% 0.49
No Quality Rating 24% 0.43 26% 0.44 23% 0.42 18% 0.39 16% 0.37 16% 0.37
Non-Profit 31% 0.46 34% 0.47 32% 0.47 35% 0.48 31% 0.46 34% 0.48
Regional 7% 0.26 7% 0.25 10% 0.30 9% 0.28 8% 0.27 8% 0.27
Demographics
Self-Enrolled 38% 0.486 28% 0.448 44% 0.496 34% 0.474 62% 0.486 53% 0.499
Assisted Enrollment 62% 0.492 72% 0.5 57% 0.483 66% 0.499 38% 0.44 47% 0.465
Age (of Head of Household) 43 14.105 45 13.228 46 14.396 42 17.657 40 14.212 38 18.445
Qualify for Catastrophic Plan 28% 0.45 5% 0.22 22% 0.42 5% 0.22 29% 0.45 8% 0.28
Family Size 1 0 2.22 0.532 1 0 2.65 0.959 1 0 2.78 1.003
California 84% 0.37 87% 0.33 57% 0.50 70% 0.46 71% 0.45 66% 0.48
Washington 10% 0.30 8% 0.28 11% 0.31 8% 0.28 9% 0.28 10% 0.29
Colorado 6% 0.24 4% 0.21 33% 0.47 22% 0.42 21% 0.40 25% 0.43
Plan quality rating variables only for CA and CO
Catastrophic Plans only shown when available to household
Table A4: Plan Choice Model with Plan Quality (CA, CO)
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.889*** 0.923*** 0.948*** 0.967*** 0.945*** 0.976***
Elasticity 1.38 2.87 2.19 2.40 2.42 2.76
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Network Size (10%) 1.15*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.25*** 1.14*** 1.20***
(0.0026) (0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0066) (0.0051) (0.0084)
High Quality (4-5 stars) 2.65*** 3.69*** 3.97*** 4.04*** 4.74*** 4.29***
(0.025) (0.059) (0.059) (0.080) (0.074) (0.113)
Medium Quality (3 stars) 1.32*** 3.08*** 1.99*** 2.73*** 1.33*** 1.79***
(0.016) (0.067) (0.045) (0.074) (0.028) (0.063)
No Quality 1.03*** 1.60*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 1.004 1.0499*
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.029)
Silver 40.1*** 26.5*** 1.98*** 2.47*** 3.31*** 1.76***
(4.8987) (0.2536) (0.0804) (0.1009) (0.1234) (0.0876)
Gold 12.4*** 3.66*** 0.71*** 0.62*** 5.02*** 1.70***
(0.9631) (0.5415) (0.0461) (0.0506) (0.3097) (0.1413)
Platinum 15.4*** 1.76*** 0.51*** 0.45*** 10.0*** 1.85***
(1.6131) (0.3577) (0.0440) (0.0490) (0.8850) (0.2192)
Cheapest Bronze Plan 0.50*** 0.31*** 2.34*** 1.54*** 2.04*** 2.12***
(0.0246) (0.0535) (0.0387) (0.0486) (0.0334) (0.0569)
Cheapest Silver Plan 1.18*** 1.15*** 1.46*** 1.33*** 1.09*** 1.08***
(0.0080) (0.0111) (0.0187) (0.0203) (0.0185) (0.0284)
Cheapest Gold Plan 0.69*** 0.66*** 1.07*** 0.98*** 0.63*** 0.64***
(0.0189) (0.0272) (0.0294) (0.0302) (0.0179) (0.0277)
Cheapest Platinum Plan 0.75*** 0.89*** 1.09*** 1.067* 0.92*** 1.02
(0.0195) (0.0354) (0.0320) (0.0405) (0.0264) (0.0471)
HMO 0.321*** 0.239*** 0.386*** 0.291*** 0.279*** 0.261***
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0067)
Deductible 1.043*** 1.013*** 0.995*** 0.993*** 1.021*** 1.000
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Max OOP 0.9912*** 0.9671*** 0.9817*** 0.9865*** 0.9956*** 0.9935***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Non-Profit Insurer 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.94*** 1.02*** 1.18*** 1.49***
(0.0056) (0.0123) (0.0091) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0269)
Regional Insurer 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.47***
(0.0062) (0.0101) (0.0077) (0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0136)
Inpatient Physician
High Coinsurance 3.40*** 3.05*** 2.25*** 3.90*** 1.18*** 1.57***
(0.0910) (0.1742) (0.1085) (0.2170) (0.0385) (0.0717)
Low Copay 1.48*** 1.26*** 1.21*** 1.53*** 0.60*** 0.961
(0.0103) (0.0159) (0.0300) (0.0449) (0.0129) (0.0324)
High Copay 0.88*** 1.20*** 0.62*** 0.78*** 0.47*** 0.62***
(0.0174) (0.0386) (0.0147) (0.0195) (0.0092) (0.0173)
(Continued on next page)
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Table A4 (Continued): Plan Choice Model with Plan Quality
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Outpatient Facility
High Coinsurance 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.47*** 0.31*** 0.54*** 0.45***
(0.0076) (0.0161) (0.0223) (0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0196)
Low Copay 0.44*** 0.34*** 1.21*** 0.942 1.10*** 0.8791**
(0.0099) (0.0131) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0362) (0.0500)
High Copay 0.87*** 0.59*** 2.24*** 1.67*** 1.87*** 1.31***
(0.0218) (0.0228) (0.0713) (0.0600) (0.0621) (0.0703)
Primary Care
High Coinsurance 0.932** 0.346*** 0.331*** 0.464*** 1.510*** 1.05
(0.0270) (0.0191) (0.0107) (0.0212) (0.0416) (0.0439)
Low Copay 2.44*** 2.37*** 1.17*** 1.57*** 1.38*** 1.30***
(0.0318) (0.0621) (0.0408) (0.0654) (0.0312) (0.0427)
High Copay 1.88*** 1.83*** 1.26*** 2.59*** 1.73*** 1.70***
(0.0248) (0.0517) (0.0234) (0.0843) (0.0231) (0.0400)
Observations 17,204,835 6,739,632 3,670,039 2,565,249 3,865,758 1,412,825
Reference categories: Bronze Plans, PPO Plans, Low coinsurance (for each service type)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Plan Quality Willingness-to-Pay
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Model Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Main Model
High Quality $1,236*** $2,118*** $2,839*** $5,030*** $2,841*** $6,107***
Medium Quality $211*** $1,355*** $1,013*** $2,594*** $346*** $2,440***
Low Quality Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
No Quality $209*** $834*** -$447*** -$423*** -$61 $188*
Enrollment Type∇
Self-Enrolled
High Quality $1,556*** $2,644*** $3,197*** $6,042*** $3,868*** $10,273***
Medium Quality $797*** $2,542*** $1,662*** $5,363*** $7 $968
No Quality $246*** $826*** -$262*** -$680*** $237*** $836***
Assisted Enrollment
High Quality $1,139*** $2,023*** $2,205*** $4,088*** $2,651*** $6,103***
Medium Quality $678*** $1,814*** $1,438*** $3,681*** $239 $2,492***
No Quality $244*** $809*** -$496*** -$491*** -$76 $46
New vs. Returning
New Enrollee
High Quality $1,485*** $2,461*** $3,138*** $5,425*** $3,525*** $7,557***
Medium Quality $474*** $1,945*** $1,539*** $3,821*** -$184*** $966***
No Quality $549*** $1,257*** -$223*** $3 $319*** $545***
Returning Enrollee
High Quality $909*** $1,573*** $2,167*** $4,273*** $2,080*** $4,437***
Medium Quality $64*** $795*** $448*** $1,417*** $636*** $3,010***
No Quality -$179*** $60*** -$615*** -$1,048*** -$353*** -$362***
By Choice Set Size∆
Small Choice Sets
High Quality $1,154*** $2,015*** $2,822*** $4,709*** $3,433*** $7,070***
Medium Quality $686*** $1,830*** $1,396*** $3,834*** -$300** -$1,007*
No Quality $66*** $618*** -$1,271*** -$1,614*** -$887*** -$1,969***
Large Choice Sets
High Quality $1,197*** $1,772*** $2,523*** $5,255*** $2,121*** $4,290***
Medium Quality $175*** $582*** $1,327*** $2,927*** $369*** $1,891***
No Quality $409*** $936*** $570*** $2,014*** $302*** $1,469***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models control for covariates from Appendix Table A4
∇ Results for the California data (where the information was available)
∆ Small vs large choice sets defined as being below vs above the median number of plans (31)
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Table A6: Plan Choice Model: State Stratifications
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
California Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.884*** 0.917*** 0.944*** 0.965*** 0.943*** 0.977***
Elasticity 0.97 2.21 2.15 2.25 2.74 2.59
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Network Size (10%) 1.22*** 1.31*** 1.23*** 1.32*** 1.17*** 1.24***
(0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0147)
Observations 13,166,292 5,420,262 2,933,613 1,993,443 2,119,930 675,584
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Colorado Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.920*** 0.952*** 0.943*** 0.970*** 0.946*** 0.971***
Elasticity 1.33 2.10 2.71 2.33 2.71 3.32
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0010)
Network Size (10%) 1.26*** 1.21*** 1.17*** 1.13*** 1.26*** 1.20***
(0.0087) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0171) (0.0111) (0.0136)
Observations 2,480,618 682,843 386,872 336,828 1,494,115 654,893
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Washington Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.909*** 0.937*** 0.914*** 0.953*** 0.904*** 0.954***
Elasticity 2.23 3.12 4.41 4.17 5.23 5.06
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0021)
Network Size (10%) 1.23*** 1.27*** 1.12*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.28***
(0.0055) (0.0099) (0.0071) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0189)
Observations 5,335,444 1,770,586 1,862,096 814,497 844,155 339,463
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7: Plan Choice Model with Plan Quality: State Stratifications
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
California Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.883*** 0.916*** 0.946*** 0.967*** 0.945*** 0.978***
Elasticity 1.16 2.52 2.19 2.41 2.61 2.51
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Network Size (10%) 0.88*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.95*** 0.92*** 0.96***
(0.0030) (0.0045) (0.0064) (0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0146)
High Quality 3.10*** 4.42*** 4.60*** 4.29*** 7.94*** 7.92***
(0.0342) (0.0751) (0.0718) (0.0943) (0.1551) (0.2791)
Missing Quality 1.23*** 1.90*** 0.97* 0.88*** 1.45*** 1.33***
(0.0096) (0.0209) (0.0131) (0.0164) (0.0240) (0.0408)
Observations 13,166,292 5,420,262 2,933,613 1,993,443 2,119,930 675,584
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Colorado Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.889*** 0.937*** 0.921*** 0.956*** 0.923*** 0.961***
Elasticity 2.37 2.75 3.85 3.41 4.18 4.64
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0010)
Network Size (10%) 1.08*** 1.18*** 1.11*** 1.12*** 1.13*** 1.12***
(0.0058) (0.0140) (0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0076) (0.0111)
High Quality 1.74*** 1.71*** 1.15** 1.31*** 2.57*** 1.53***
(0.0349) (0.0607) (0.0507) (0.0527) (0.0588) (0.0453)
Missing Quality 2.08*** 4.73*** 3.29*** 7.21*** 5.11*** 28.67
(0.1767) (1.0355) (0.8947) (3.4238) (0.7766) (15.0761)
Observations 2,480,618 682,843 386,872 336,828 1,494,115 654,893
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A8: Plan Choice Model: Instrumenting for Premium
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.945*** 0.973*** 0.967*** 0.982*** 0.960*** 0.984***
Elasticity 1.00 0.90 1.38 1.29 1.75 1.64
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Network Size (10%) 1.28*** 1.32*** 1.20*** 1.30*** 1.17*** 1.21***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 22,540,279 8,510,218 5,532,135 3,379,746 4,709,913 1,752,288
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A9: Plan Choice Mixed Logit Model
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.836*** 0.887*** 0.907*** 0.952*** 0.895*** 0.967***
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0014)
Network Size (10%) 1.25*** 1.37*** 1.18*** 1.32*** 1.21*** 1.22***
(0.0062) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0150) (0.0122) (0.0184)
Premium Coefficient Distribution (Odds Ratios)
10th Percentile 0.720 0.818 0.875 0.926 0.849 0.951
25th Percentile 0.757 0.835 0.887 0.932 0.862 0.954
Median 0.803 0.857 0.902 0.938 0.884 0.958
75th Percentile 0.865 0.878 0.919 0.943 0.910 0.961
90th Percentile 0.931 0.914 0.943 0.951 0.938 0.966
Network Size Coefficient Distribution (Odds Ratios)
10th Percentile 0.948 0.966 0.931 1.068 1.237 1.239
25th Percentile 1.072 1.095 1.009 1.120 1.242 1.240
Median 1.243 1.309 1.152 1.235 1.246 1.241
75th Percentile 1.514 1.636 1.351 1.366 1.252 1.241
90th Percentile 1.809 1.991 1.560 1.479 1.257 1.242
Observations 22,540,279 8,510,218 5,532,135 3,379,746 4,709,913 1,752,288
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A10: Plan Choice Model: Alternative Provider Network Measures
Not Scaled by Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Group Providers Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.895*** 0.926*** 0.951*** 0.969*** 0.947*** 0.977***
Elasticity 2.43 3.13 2.20 2.41 2.60 2.57
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Network Size (10%) 1.05*** 1.17*** 1.03*** 1.14*** 1.01 1.04***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Rating Region Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Provider Networks Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.894*** 0.925*** 0.950*** 0.968*** 0.946*** 0.977***
Elasticity 2.42 3.15 2.21 2.42 2.61 2.60
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Network Size (10%) 1.18*** 1.27*** 1.13*** 1.23*** 1.059*** 1.10***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 22,540,279 8,510,218 5,532,135 3,379,746 4,709,913 1,752,288
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A11: Plan Choice Model: Alternative Plan Quality Categories
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Premium ($100) 0.884*** 0.919*** 0.947*** 0.966*** 0.944*** 0.975***
Elasticity 3.14 2.16 2.47 2.44 2.78 2.30
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Network Size (10%) 1.11*** 1.14*** 1.17*** 1.20*** 1.11*** 1.12***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
High Quality 2.57*** 3.34*** 3.73*** 3.50*** 4.57*** 3.72***
(0.0145) (0.0320) (0.0422) (0.0476) (0.0577) (0.0759)
No Quality 1.03*** 1.56*** 0.79*** 0.74*** 0.94*** 0.91***
(0.0058) (0.0131) (0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0151) (0.0241)
Observations 17,204,835 6,739,632 3,670,039 2,565,249 3,865,758 1,412,825
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3: Plan Switching Decisions in
California’s Health Insurance Marketplace
Abstract
Plan switching rates among returning Marketplace enrollees have remained con-
sistently high. However, not much is known about the underlying reasons for
the plan switching decisions of this population. Using 2016-2017 data from
California’s Marketplace, I examine how changes in the attributes of chosen
plans over time may affect enrollee decisions to switch plans or disenroll from
the Marketplace. I find that plan switching decisions on Marketplace are sig-
nificantly affected by changes in the premium, changes in provider network
size, and changes in plan quality of chosen plans. A plan’s 10 percentage-point
(p.p.) decrease in network size is associated with a 5-13 p.p. increase in the
probability an enrollee switches plans on the Marketplace in the following year,
and an increase in plan quality is associated with a 10-15 p.p. decrease in the
probability of switching, relative to a decrease in plan quality. Additionally, en-
rollees who are newly enrolled, older, or had assistance in enrollment exhibited
a lower likelihood of subsequently disenrolling from the Marketplace.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, an increasing share of US households without access to affordable
employer-sponsored health insurance have enrolled in Affordable Care Act (ACA)
Marketplace/Exchange plans (Ericson et al., 2017). The Marketplaces were estab-
lished to deliver quality insurance to individuals at affordable prices by relying on
consumer choice, product transparency, and market competition to incentivize insur-
ers to provide such plans. Since the initial enrollment period, consumers have main-
tained high plan switching rates. Around 30% of returning enrollees on the Federally
Facilitated Marketplace (FFM) switched plans in 2015, compared to 2.8% among en-
rollees in employer-sponsored health plans and 7% among those in the Massachusetts
Health Connector (Sanger-Katz, 2018; DeLeire and Marks, 2015).
However, not much is known about the plan switching and disenrollment de-
cisions of ACA enrollees, who constitute 4% of the US population (Barnett and
Vornovitsky, 2016). Though there are various potential explanations, not much is
known about the specific factors contributing to the switching rates and the plan-
level factors that affect consumer switching decisions. Additionally, several promi-
nent insurers have scaled back or exited from the Marketplaces in recent years. A
better understanding of consumer plan switching decisions could inform policymakers
in their assessment of programs addressing the continuity of coverage and care among
enrollees. It could also help inform insurers’ plan offering decisions over time in order
to retain a higher share of enrollees.
This paper examines how changes in the attributes of chosen plans over time
may affect enrollee decisions to switch plans or disenroll from the Marketplace. Specif-
ically, I focus on how consumers may respond to changes in the premium, provider
network size, and plan quality of their chosen plans in the subsequent enrollment
period in the California Marketplace.
California Marketplace enrollees’ plan switching decisions are significantly af-
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fected by changes in the premium, network size, and plan quality of their chosen plan.
A 10% increase in total premium and a 10 p.p. decrease in provider network size are
respectively associated with a 10 p.p. and 5-13 p.p. increases in the probability
of switching plans among enrollees who stay on the Marketplace. Likewise, having
an increase in one’s plan quality rating (relative to a decrease) is associated with a
10-15 p.p. reduction in the likelihood of switching plans. Furthermore, disenroll-
ment decisions seem to be correlated with person-level characteristics, as age (head
of household) and having assisted enrollment are positive associated with decisions
to re-enroll on the Marketplace.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature, and Section 3 provides details on the methods and data. Section 4 presents
the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a paucity of research studies exploring plan switching in the context of
the ACA Marketplaces. Ericson et al. (2017) uses a randomized study design to
find that providing personalized potential cost savings information to enrollees made
them more likely to shop around, but not switch plans in the Colorado Marketplace.
In general, most research to date has been disseminated through reports issued by
the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE). DeLeire
and Marks (2015) find that enrollees in the Federally-Facilitated Marketplaces (FFM)
are sensitive to plan premium changes (with a premium elasticity of around 3) after
controlling for mean premium changes of other plans in their given choice set. Two
other policy research briefs from ASPE (2016, 2017) find that a large share (43%) of
returning consumers switched plans in 2016, and that consumers were more responsive
to net premium changes rather than total premium changes.
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Outside of the ACA context, there is quite an extensive literature on plan
switching, notably in Medicare Part D (prescription drug plans). Earlier studies
such as Kling et al. (2008) and Bundorf and Szrek (2010) have used randomized
experiments to find that: 1) enrollees presented with personalized information on
potential cost savings in changing plans are more likely to switch plans and incur
lower expected costs without reductions in plan quality and that 2) the size of a choice
set faced by an enrollee is not associated with the probability of plan enrollment or
switching.
With the increased accessibility of individual level administrative data, the ex-
isting body of literature on plan switching in Part D and other employer-sponsored
insurance settings with insurance choice has largely been focused on whether con-
sumers make “good” choices and whether they have “improved” over time. This has
been done by estimating models of plan switching to assess how consumers may be
overspending over time (Heiss et al., 2016; Ketcham et al., 2012, 2015; Abaluck and
Gruber, 2016). However, these studies have found somewhat mixed results with re-
spect to the effects of plan switching decisions (or lack thereof) on consumer welfare.
Other studies such as Polyakova (2016) and Handel and Kolstad (2015) have found
considerable switching costs and plan inertia among enrollees in plan choice settings.
The few related studies in the ACA context (and most studies in other insur-
ance settings) have focused on consumer choice and switching decisions with respect
to changes in premiums and cost-sharing. Consequently, this paper is the first to
examine plan switching decisions in the ACA Marketplace as a function a broader
set of changes in plan attributes and choice set characteristics, including notable non-
financial attributes such as network size and plan quality. Moreover, this paper also
adds to the nascent ACA plan switching literature by exploring disenrollment deci-
sions as related to household characteristics and changes in plan attributes over time.
In assessing enrollee plan switching decisions, this paper also uses data from more re-
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cent enrollment periods (2016-2017) relative to other studies, which can shed light on
consumer dynamics among enrollees who are more experienced with the Marketplace.
3 Methods
Models to Assess Plan Switching Decisions
I use logistic (logit) regressions to analyze enrollee decisions to disenroll from the
Marketplace. The specification for the decision to disenroll from the Marketplace is:
Logit(Disenrolli) = ∆P
′








iφ + εij (1)
where P, S are the respective vectors of plan attributes and means of enrollee i’s
choice set in 2016 (Year 1)1, ∆P, ∆S are the respective vectors for changes in plan
attributes (of the plan chosen in Year 1) and changes in choice set means for each
enrollee, and C is a set of household characteristics. The outcome is modeled as the
log odds (or logit) of disenrollment. The specific variables will be discussed in the
Data section to follow. The regression is at the household-year level.
I also model plan switching decisions using similar logit regressions. I estimate
this model on consumers who enrolled on the California Marketplace in both 2016
and 2017. I exclude households who were forced to switch plans to remain on the
Marketplace (those who chose a plan in 2016 which subsequently got canceled as well
as those who moved to a different rating region between 2016 and 2017). The main
specification to examine enrollee plan switching decisions is as follows:
Logit(Switchi) = ∆P
′








iφ + εij (2)
Note that the right-hand side of this specification is exactly the same as in Equation 1
1Thus ∆Pi = Pi,2017 − Pi,2016 and likewise for ∆Si.
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for disenrollment decisions. For both the disenrollment and plan switching models, the
coefficients of interest are α. These shed light on how changes to an enrollees’ chosen
plans are associated with decisions to switch plans or disenroll from the Marketplace.
I also conduct analyses using binary outcome variables for specific types of plan
switching, separately for switching by plan type, insurer, and metal tier. I also include
insurer brand fixed effects for chosen plans in Year 1. This would eliminate the time-
invariant unobserved factors affecting the switching probability for each chosen plan
(in Year 1). All coefficients are exponentiated to be presented as odds ratios (OR). I
convert the coefficients of interest from odds ratios into marginal effects to identify the
percent point changes in the probability of disenrolling or switching plans associated
with the changes in the attributes of one’s chosen plan.
Identification and Robustness Checks
As stated above, the main model addresses the identification issues to some extent
by including brand fixed effects for chosen plans as well as some demographic char-
acteristics. A key issue is that plan premiums may be endogenous due to unobserved
demand factors. I address this issue by running robustness checks that instrument
for each plan’s premium (and change in premium) with the average premium of that
plan offered in other rating regions in each given state.2 I also run a specification with
premium and network size changes as categorical variables to explore the potential
non-linearity in the relationship between plan switching decisions and premium and
network size.
A key limitation is the fact that I do not have data on health (neither for
health status nor health care utilization), which would undoubtedly be an important
confounder to causal estimates for plan switching. The results from the logit models
2This approach has been previous used to identify plan attribute coefficients by variations across
plans offered by the same brands in a region. However, the exclusion restriction may not necessarily
be satisfied for the instrument, as noted by Abaluck and Gruber (2011). Thus, the main models will
not use the instrumented premium, though the results are quite comparable.
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for plan switching and disenrollment decisions should be interpreted as associations,
rather than causal estimates.
4 Data
I use individual-level enrollment data for 2016 and 2017 from the California Market-
place along with additional data from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health
Insurance Exchange (HIX) Compare on plan characteristics and from Vericred on
provider networks. The state enrollment data includes information on plans selected
by each enrollee along with demographic information including age, family income as
a percent of the federal poverty limit (FPL), Advanced Premium Tax Credit (APTC)
amounts, gender, subsidy eligibility, and smoking status. These individual-level data
are then collapsed to the household level to examine household level plan choice and
plan switching decisions.
The final analytic file for this paper is constructed by merging these data sets at
the region-county level for each state along with additional plan quality information
from the California Health Benefits Exchange.3 This includes a total of 856,587
households in California in 2016 who were enrolled in Marketplace plans. Table 1
presents the specific breakdown for the disenrollment and plan switching samples.
Model Variables
I run all models separately for six subsamples based on individual versus family
enrollment and by income group (under 250% FPL, 250-400% FPL, and over 400%
FPL). The income groups are created to match the cut-offs for CSR eligibility (up to
3The reason why the merge is done for each county-region as opposed to the rating region level
is because not all plans offered in a region are offered in each county within that region, if a region
spans multiple counties in a state. While virtually all counties are contained completely within a
rating region, an exception is California’s Los Angeles County, which is composed of two rating
regions that together span the county.
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250% FPL) and tax credit eligibility (up to 400% FPL) which affect the net premiums
faced by enrollees.4,5 Plan switching is delineated by whether an enrollee’s chosen
Marketplace plans differs from their previously chosen plan by either insurer brand,
metal tier, or plan type.
The variables for plan attributes, choice set mean characteristics, and the
changes in these two sets of variables are described in the following sections. The
coefficients of interest for the plan switching logit models are the changes in the plan
attributes of chosen plans between Years 1 and 2 (2016-2017). The plan attributes of
interest are premium, provider network size, and plan quality.
Provider Network Size, Plan Quality, and Premium
Plan provider network size is measured as the share of physicians that are in-network
in the state rating region in which the plan is sold.6 The Vericred data lists all of the
providers covered by each plan. To calculate the provider network size for each plan,
I calculate the number of physicians in the rating region within the provider network
and divide it by the total number of physicians in the respective rating region as
the denominator.7 Since the data provides information on both individual and group
providers by specialty, I adjust and account for the group size of group providers by
physician specialty when constructing the provider network size measures.
4Both of these cutoffs are strict cutoffs. CSRs and tax credit subsidies abruptly stop for individ-
uals over 250% and 400% FPL, respectively. Tax credits adjustments are made to account for the
difference in the actual annual income versus the income declared when an enrollee signs up for a
Marketplace plan, but no similar adjustments are made for CSRs.
5Household income levels in the California data are presented as has six categories of percent
FPL (under 138, 138-150, 150-200, 200-250, 250-400, and over 400% FPL).
6Technically, the denominator is defined as the total number of physicians in the counties in a
state rating region in which a plan is sold. This distinction is made because a small share of plans
are only sold in a strict subset of counties in the respective state rating region. A plan not entering
into a particular set of counties in the state rating region would thus have no need to network with
the providers in those counties.
7The unit of observation in the raw provider network data is either an individual physician or a
group physician practice (with the specialty denoted in both cases). The majority of physicians in
the data are listed as an individual physician. The physician groups are categorized by physician
specialty but are not given an exact group size. To address this issue, I multiply each group practice
by the average number of physicians in a group practice of that specialty.
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I create a quality measure based on four categories: low quality (1-2 stars),
medium quality (3 stars), and high quality (4-5 stars), and “no quality.”8,9 A continu-
ous plan quality measure from 1-5 stars cannot be constructed because 14% of plans
have “no quality” as their plan quality rating. These “no quality” measures are not
missing data, but rather show up to enrollees as having no quality rating available
when viewed on the Exchange website. These cutoffs in the plan quality variable
are selected to roughly delineate the plan choices in three similarly sized categories
among plans with available quality ratings. While quality ratings are generally given
at the insurer level, some insurers have different quality ratings pertaining to different
plan types.10
I utilize total annual household premiums for the plan switching models. Total
premiums are used instead of net premiums (net of tax credits) in order to reduce
the direct influence of changes in income from the associations between changes in
premium costs and enrollee decisions to switch plans or disenroll. Other financial
attributes included in the models are: metal tier, deductible, maximum out-of-pocket
(OOP) amount, and plan type (HMO or PPO).
Changes in Plan Attributes
The coefficients on the changes in the plans attributes of each enrollee’s chosen plan
from Year 1 to Year 2 are the coefficients of interest for the plan switching logit
models. The variables of interest are: percent change in total premium, change in
8Lin and McCarthy (2018) use this high quality plan cutoff definition.
9Consumers are provided an overall quality rating based on 3 major aspects of plan performance:
getting the right care, care experience, and plan services for members. These quality measures are
constructed using: a) health records of a sample of members from each plan (checked to compare
their medical care with standards for care and treatments that are proven to help patients and
whether they got unnecessary care), b) multiple aspects of health care quality checked by medical
charts and billing (for issues like proper controls for high blood pressure, lowering cholesterol, getting
proper medications), and c) a survey of members’ experiences with their providers and care along
with their experiences in obtaining information from the plan’s service staff.
10Some insurers may only have quality ratings for one type of plan but not another (e.g. for their
HMOs but not their PPOs).
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network size, and changes in plan quality.11
Choice Set Means and Changes in Choice Set Means
The logit models for plan switching and disenrollment include choice set mean char-
acteristics (for Year 1) and changes in choice set mean characteristics between Years
1 and 2. These choice set control variables help isolate the measures of consumer
responsiveness to changes in plan attributes independent of the changes in the choice
sets that consumers face. Consumer responsiveness to plan switching (when faced
with a 10% increase in their plan’s premium, for example) may be different when the
average plan in their choice set has a 4% increase in premium versus a 25% increase
in premium. Choice set mean characteristics include: the number of plans available
in one’s choice set, average total premium, average network size, and the share of
plans in each quality rating category (high, medium, low, or none). The changes in
these choice set level measures between 2016 and 2017 are included as well.
Household/Personal Characteristics
The logit models for plan switching and disenrollment decisions also include the
following household covariates: age (head of household), whether a household self-
enrolled (versus using a plan Navigator or some other form of assisted enrollment),
and whether a household was newly enrolled on the California Marketplace in 2016
(Year 1).





Table 1 shows the plan switching and disenrollment decisions made by enrollees.
67% of 2016 enrollees re-enrolled onto ACA Marketplace plans in 2017, suggesting
a significant turnover rate in the ACA Marketplaces as noted in DeLeire and Marks
(2015). Among enrollees in the plan switching sample (who both re-enrolled and were
not forced to switch plans to stay on the Marketplace), 15% of enrollees switched
plans between 2016 and 2017. Among plan switchers (henceforth “switchers”), 64%,
43%, and 48% switched insurers, metals, and plan types (with a considerable share
of people switching across more than one category).
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the main plan switching logit models,
separately for switchers and non-switchers. As expected, plan switchers faced larger
increases in annual premium (both in absolute and percent changes) relative non-
switchers. At the same time, non-switchers (switchers) were comparatively more
likely to have an increase (decrease) in their plan’s quality rating. The network size
change is quite similar across the two groups, with both decrease around 6 percentage
points, which is reflective of the overall trend towards narrow networks among ACA
Marketplace plans in recent years (Polsky et al. 2017).
The changes in choice set mean characteristics from 2016-2017, choice set mean
characteristics in Year 1 (2016), and person level characteristics are fairly similar for
switchers versus non-switchers. It is worth noting that there is quite a substantial
increase in the share of low quality (1-2 star) plans in California between 2016 and
2017, with that share rising over 30 percentage points as a fraction of all available
plans. The attributes of chosen plans in Year 1 (2016) are also fairly similar between
the two groups. One notable difference is that a much higher proportion of non-
switchers (36%) chose high quality plans in Year 1, relative to non-switchers (20%).
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Moreover, a greater share of switchers experienced decreases in plan quality (49%)
relative to non-switchers (35%). These differences are suggestive of plan switching
decisions that may be driven in part by dissatisfaction with plan quality over time.
Table 4 shows the changes in the attributes of actual chosen plans in 2016
and 2017 for the full sample, separately for switchers and non-switchers. Switchers
tend to have a smaller increase in premium and larger reductions in plan network size
(compare their 2016 and 2017 chosen plans), relative to non-switchers.
Disenrollment Decisions
Table 5 shows the logit model results for 2016 enrollees’ decisions to disenroll from the
Marketplace in 2017. There do not seem to be any specific associative trends between
changes in plan attributes and disenrollment decisions. However, there are several
enrollee characteristics associated with disenrollment decisions. Being a new enrollee
(first-time enrollees in 2016) is associated with having around 1.2 times higher odds
of re-enrolling on the Marketplace, relative to returning enrollees. Age (among heads
of household) and re-enrollment on the Marketplace are also positive correlated.
In addition, enrollees under 400% FPL who self-enrolled in 2016 are signifi-
cantly less likely to re-enroll into Marketplace plans relative to those who used a Plan
Navigator or other form of assisted enrollment in 2016 (with about 0.9 times the odds
of re-enrollment). To be sure, disenrollment from the Marketplace is not necessary a
negative outcome itself. For example, Gordon et al. (2018) found that a considerable
share of ACA beneficiaries who disenrolled from the Marketplace enrolled into Med-
icaid. Nevertheless, given that households using assisted enrollment are associated
with being significantly more likely to re-enroll onto the ACA Marketplace (and thus
less likely to have an interruption in their coverage), it may be worthwhile to further
examine the impact of Plan Navigators and enrollment assistance as interventions to
help ACA enrollees with re-enrollment and to help provide continuity of coverage.
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Plan Switching Decisions
The results for the main plan switching logit models are shown in Table 6. As
expected, increases in plan premium and decreases in network size of chosen plans
are associated with enrollees being more likely to switch plans. A 10% increase in
total premium and a 10 p.p. decrease in network size are respectively associated
with a 9-13 p.p. and 5-13 p.p. greater probability of switching plans, with higher
income enrollees relatively more sensitive to changes in network size. Furthermore,
having an increase in the plan quality of one’s chosen plan is associated with a 10-
15 p.p. reduction in the likelihood of switching plans, relative to having a decrease
in plan quality. These results are consistently robust across income levels and for
individuals versus families. Enrollees appear to be quite responsive to changes in
key non-financial plan attributes (network size and plan quality) in their decisions to
switch plans.
Additionally, having a plan with a larger network size in the first year is associ-
ated with significantly lower odds (0.6-0.8) of subsequently switching plans. Moreover,
being a new enrollee (in 2016) is associated with having lower odds of switching plans,
conditional on re-enrollment.
Types of Plan Switching
Table 7 presents the marginal probabilities for specific types of plan switching as a
function of the changes in plan attributes of one’s chosen plan from the previous year.
For conciseness, all subsequent results tables will only show the marginal probabilities
on plan switching associated with changes in plan attributes. The three outcomes
modeled denote plan switching along: 1) insurer, 2) metal tier, and 3) plan type.12
As expected, premium increases are associated with a higher probability of switching
12These categories are not mutually exclusive. Refer to Table 1 for the specific breakdown of the
types of plan switching.
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along all three axes. Enrollees who want to shop around for comparatively cheaper
plans can ostensibly do so by switching along any of the three axes.
However, enrollees who face a decrease in network size (10 p.p.) have a higher
probability of switching plans by plan type (2-4 p.p.) and insurers (2 p.p.), but not
metal tier.13 This makes sense as switching along metal tier alone would not affect
one’s plan network size. The consistent response to switching along plan types also
makes sense in light of the fact that PPOs tend to have much larger network sizes
than HMOs. As HMOs have more limited out-of-network coverage, enrollees in these
plans could therefore be more adversely affected by reductions in network size over
time.
Likewise, enrollees appear responsive to increases in the quality rating of their
chosen plan by exhibiting lower probabilities of switching along insurers (5-9 p.p.
reduction) and plan type (8-21 p.p. reduction), but not metal tier. As with network
size, plan quality varies across insurers and sometimes by plan types within insurers,
but not by metal tier.
Robustness Checks for Plan Switching Decision Results
The robustness checks for the plan switching results with instrumented premiums
(for both total premiums and changes in total premiums) are presented in Table 8.
Overall, the results with instrumented plan premiums are highly similar to those
found in the main model. The associations between reductions in plan network size
and plan switching are smaller in magnitude, but are still largely significant.
Table 9 displays the results for an alternative specification with indicator vari-
ables for changes in total premium and plan network size to explore potentially non-
linear associations between these factors and plan switching decisions. The respective
reference categories are for chosen plans with a less than 10% increase in total pre-
13The effect for switching along insurers is not significant for enrollees with incomes between
250-400% FPL.
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mium and for plans that exhibit an increase in network size between 2016 and 2017.
As expected, larger premium increase categories are associated with higher probabil-
ities of switching plans. However, the relationship between changes to network size
and plan switching decision does not seem to be as proportional, as there is not much
of a difference when comparing a network size reduction of 0-10 p.p. to a reduction
of more than 10 p.p.
6 Conclusion
Enrollee plan switching decisions on the ACA Marketplace are significantly affected
by changes in the key non-financial attributes of their chosen plans over time. The
probability that an enrollee switches plans on the Marketplace in a subsequent en-
rollment period is strongly associated with reductions in provider network size and
increases in the premium of their plan. Likewise, increases in plan quality are associ-
ated with significant decreases in the likelihood of switching plans in the subsequent
year, relative to decreases in plan quality. On the other hand, disenrollment deci-
sions seem to be less correlated with changes in plan attributes relative to household
characteristics. However, enrollees who are older (age of head of household), new to
the Marketplace (in the previous year), or had assistance in enrollment are relatively
more likely to re-enroll onto the Marketplace.
A key limitation is that the Marketplace enrollment data does not have corre-
sponding data on health care utilization or spending. As such, I am not able to take
into account changes in health status or health utilization, which would be a critical
confounder impacting plan switching decisions in regards to how enrollees respond to
changes in their health plans. In addition, coverage decisions may also be affected
by changes in employer-sponsored coverage or changes in income that would make
enrollees Medicaid-eligible. These changes would confound a causal interpretation of
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disenrollment decision estimates. The results of this paper therefore serve as descrip-
tive associations and ballpark figures rather than more particular estimates of causal
effects.
A limitation to generalizability is that the study only uses data from Califor-
nia. The average Marketplace enrollee in California has more plans and insurers to
choose from than the average enrollee in the US. However, given the relatively good
“health” of the California Marketplace in providing ample choice of health plans for
enrollees, the results are useful in describing the results under a setting that is more
representative of an environment as intended by the ACA’s implementers.
Despite these limitations, the results show that enrollee plan switching deci-
sions on the Marketplace are consistently associated with changes in premium and the
key non-financial attributes (network size and plan quality) in the expected directions.
This seems to strongly suggest that ACA enrollees have a significant responsiveness
to changes in provider network size and quality (along with premium) in their plan
switching decisions. Consumer responsiveness to changes in plan quality and net-
work size could inform insurers’ decisions to continue to invest in these attributes in
order to attract and retain enrollees in their plans, especially when they may have
a more limited ability to compete on premiums due to plan standardization in the
ACA Marketplaces.
Furthermore, given that the use of assisted enrollment (through Plan Naviga-
tors) is associated with a lower probability that an enrollee subsequently disenrolls
from the ACA Marketplace (and thus reduces the likelihood of having an interrup-
tion in coverage), it may be worthwhile for policymakers and researchers to further
examine the impact of Plan Navigators and assisted enrollment channels towards the
objective of maintaining continuity of care and coverage for ACA enrollees. Future
research could utilize data from available state all-payer claims databases to take
into account health status and health care utilization in examining plan switching
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and disenrollment decisions. Researchers using these data can also more explicitly
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Tables
Table 1: Plan Switching and Enrollment
Observations Percent
2016 California Enrolled Households 856,587
Re-Enrolled on CA Marketplace 571,068 67%
Plan Switching Sample * 506,463 59%
Among Plan Switching Sample
Plan Switchers 77,677 15%
Among Plan Switchers
Switched Insurer Only 14,048 18%
Switched Metal Tier Only 3,439 4%
Switched Plan Type Only 24,376 31%
Switched Insurer and Metal Tier 22,696 29%
Switched Insurer and Plan Type 5,570 7%
Switched Metal Tier and Plan Type 522 1%
Switched All Three Aspects 7,026 9%
* This consists of households that re-enrolled in 2017 who were not forced to switch plans due to
plan cancellations or moving to a different state rating region.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Switchers Non-Switchers
Mean SD Mean SD
Changes, Attributes of Chosen Plan, 2016-17
Percent Change, Total Premium 15% 0.07 12% 0.07
Change, Total Premium $1,176 987 $852 801
Change, Network Size (p.p.) -6.2 7.6 -6.1 7.4
Increase in Plan Quality 21% 0.41 40% 0.49
Decrease in Plan Quality 49% 0.50 35% 0.48
No Change in Plan Quality* 30% 0.46 25% 0.43
Changes, Choice Set Mean Characteristics, 2016-17
Change, Number of Plans in Choice Set 3.6 2.4 3.4 2.7
Percent Change, Premium 1.9% 0.02 1.8% 0.01
Change, Average Provider Network Size (p.p.) -5.6 2.7 -5.9 3.1
Change, Share of High Quality Plans (4-5 stars) -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06
Change, Share of Medium Quality Plans (3 stars) -0.17 0.07 -0.18 0.07
Change, Share of Low Quality Plans (1-2 stars) 0.32 0.09 0.34 0.10
Change, Share of Plans with No Quality -0.14 0.08 -0.15 0.09
Attributes of Chosen Plan, 2016
Total Premium (Individual) $5,171 $2,450 $5,119 $2,392
Total Premium (Family) $11,327 $4,563 $11,388 $4,496
Net Premium (Individual) $2,517 $2,014 $2,129 $1,772
Net Premium (Family) $4,166 $3,997 $3,895 $3,669
Network Size (% of Physicians) 20% 0.11 18% 0.11
Deductible (Individual) $2,720 $1,908 $2,985 $1,724
Deductible (Family) $5,441 $3,815 $5,970 $3,449
Max OOP (Individual) $6,101 660 $6,206 470
Max OOP (Family) $12,200 1,319 $12,410 941
Bronze Plan** 16% 0.36 20% 0.39
Silver Plan 65% 0.48 72% 0.45
Gold Plan 9% 0.29 5% 0.21
Platinum Plan 9% 0.28 4% 0.20
HMO Plan 46% 0.50 61% 0.49
PPO Plan 54% 0.50 39% 0.49
High Quality (4-5 stars) 20% 0.40 36% 0.48
Medium Quality (3 stars) 49% 0.50 35% 0.48
Low Quality (1-2 stars) 10% 0.30 13% 0.34
No Quality 21% 0.41 16% 0.36
Choice Set Mean Characteristics, 2016
Number of Plans in Choice Set 29 6.0 28 6.5
Average Total Premium (Individual) $5,594 2,363 $5,786 2,499
Average Total Premium (Family) $12,379 4,375 $12,836 4,603
Average Network Size (% of Physicians) 16% 0.04 16% 0.04
Share of High Quality Plans 22% 0.09 23% 0.10
Share of Medium Quality Plans 19% 0.07 21% 0.07
Share of Low Quality Plans 32% 0.09 31% 0.08
Share of Plans with No Quality 26% 0.09 25% 0.09
Observations 77,677 428,786
* Includes a few plans changing from “No Quality” to obtaining a star rating.
** Includes a small share of Catastrophic plans
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Table 3: Enrollee Characteristics
Switchers Non-Switchers
Enrollee Characteristics, 2016 Mean SD Mean SD
Under 250% FPL 68% 0.47 70% 0.46
250-400% FPL 21% 0.41 20% 0.40
Over 400% FPL 11% 0.31 10% 0.30
Individual 61% 0.49 67% 0.47
Age (Head of Household) 43 14 44 14
Self-Enrolled 36% 0.48 38% 0.48
New Enrollee 64% 0.48 64% 0.48
Qualify for Catastrophic Plan 18% 0.38 18% 0.39
Household Size 1.6 0.84 1.5 0.81
Observations 77,677 428,786
Table 4: Changes in Attributes of Chosen Plans, 2016-2017
Full Sample Switchers Non-Switchers
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Change, Total Premium $927 1,616 $765 2,102 $991 1,375
Change, Net Premium $405 1,657 $212 1,979 $481 1,506
Change, Network Size (p.p.) -7.9 9.8 -12.6 13.1 -6.1 7.4
Increase in Plan Quality 34% 0.47 18% 0.38 40% 0.49
Decrease in Plan Quality 29% 0.46 15% 0.36 35% 0.48
Observations 506,483 77,677 428,786
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Table 5: Re-Enrollment Decision
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Odds Ratios (unless noted) Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Changes, Attributes of Chosen Plan, 2016-17
Change, Premium (10%) 1.005 1.0003 1.010 1.036 0.963 1.003
Marginal Probability 0.001 0.0001 0.002 0.007 -0.009 0.001
(0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028) (0.053)
Network Size Decrease (10 p.p.) 0.89*** 1.19*** 0.97 1.21*** 0.78*** 0.80**
Marginal Probability -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 -0.05
(0.019) (0.041) (0.044) (0.067) (0.046) (0.083)
Increase in Plan Quality 0.86** 1.19 0.84 1.23 1.11 0.88
Marginal Probability -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.03
(0.052) (0.16) (0.090) (0.17) (0.12) (0.18)
No Change in Plan Quality 0.71*** 1.04 0.81** 1.11 0.99 0.77
Marginal Probability -0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.002 -0.06
(0.042) (0.14) (0.079) (0.14) (0.090) (0.13)
Change, Deductible ($100) 0.998 0.996 0.999 1.009 1.027 1.032*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.021) (0.017)
Change, Maximum OOP ($100) 1.073*** 1.030** 1.049*** 1.009 1.015 0.998
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Changes, Choice Set Mean Characteristics, 2016-17
Change, Choice Set Size 0.94*** 1.00 0.95*** 1.01 0.90*** 0.93***
(Number of Plans) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Percent Change, Premium 1.14*** 1.16*** 1.10*** 1.11*** 1.25*** 1.09
(0.019) (0.032) (0.034) (0.043) (0.049) (0.066)
Change, Average Network Size 1.12*** 1.52*** 0.97 1.57*** 1.14 1.27
(10 p.p.) (0.034) (0.075) (0.062) (0.12) (0.10) (0.19)
Change, High Quality Share 0.17*** 38.0*** 0.094*** 3.35*** 0.082*** 0.13**
(0.029) (10.9) (0.033) (1.45) (0.040) (0.11)
Change, Medium Quality Share 0.49*** 110*** 0.22*** 6.86*** 0.49 0.82
(0.084) (30.7) (0.076) (2.92) (0.22) (0.62)
Change, No Quality Share 1.40*** 2.43*** 1.30 0.83 3.45*** 2.31*
(0.16) (0.47) (0.28) (0.23) (1.00) (1.11)
Attributes of Chosen Plan, 2016
Premium ($100) 0.988*** 1.003*** 0.990*** 1.005*** 0.996*** 1.004***
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0004)
Network Size 1.13*** 0.87*** 1.07** 0.88*** 1.23*** 1.15*
(% of Physicians) (0.018) (0.023) (0.036) (0.037) (0.050) (0.082)
Bronze Plan 1.38*** 2.01*** 1.07* 1.47*** 1.05 1.44***
(0.059) (0.49) (0.040) (0.19) (0.039) (0.18)
Silver Plan 1.10*** 1.45*** 0.93** 1.13** 0.97 1.15*
(0.025) (0.12) (0.030) (0.058) (0.043) (0.089)
HMO Plan 0.84*** 0.93 0.83 0.87 1.34*** 0.87
(0.053) (0.13) (0.094) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17)
Deductible ($100) 0.99*** 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maximum OOP ($100) 0.98*** 0.99** 0.98*** 1.00 0.99** 1.00
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 5 (Continued): Re-Enrollment Decision
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Odds Ratios (unless noted) Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Choice Set Mean Characteristics, 2016
Choice Set Size 1.01*** 0.97*** 1.01* 0.98*** 0.99* 0.99
(Number of Plans) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0067)
Average Premium ($100) 1.02*** 1.01** 1.00 0.99*** 0.97*** 0.96***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Average Network Size 0.88*** 1.70*** 0.79*** 1.66*** 0.75*** 1.03
(% of Physicians) (0.025) (0.080) (0.045) (0.12) (0.058) (0.13)
High Quality Share 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.68** 0.70* 0.96 1.07
(0.024) (0.030) (0.11) (0.13) (0.20) (0.35)
Medium Quality Share 0.74** 0.49*** 1.54* 0.81 2.91*** 3.18**
(0.10) (0.13) (0.39) (0.27) (0.98) (1.76)
No Quality Share 0.53*** 0.19*** 1.44 0.51** 2.44*** 1.72
(0.055) (0.032) (0.32) (0.14) (0.69) (0.80)
Person Level Characteristics
Age (Head of Household) 1.029*** 1.007*** 1.029*** 1.004*** 1.014*** 1.002**
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0008)
Self-Enrollment 0.89*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.88*** 0.99 0.96
(0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.027)
New Enrollee (in 2016) 1.16*** 1.26*** 1.16*** 1.29*** 1.17*** 1.17***
(0.0082) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.020) (0.034)
Constant 3.14*** 12.5*** 1.91** 2.36** 2.67*** 3.39**
(0.51) (4.81) (0.56) (0.92) (0.85) (1.89)
Observations 423,439 185,661 95,053 66,837 63,742 21,855
Reference categories: gold/platinum plans, PPO plans, low quality plans, decrease in plan quality
Insurer brand fixed effects are included and robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Plan Switching Decision
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Odds Ratios (unless noted) Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Changes, Attributes of Chosen Plan, 2016-17
Change, Premium (10%) 2.31*** 2.45*** 2.39*** 2.21*** 2.92*** 2.18***
Marginal Probability 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.10
(0.055) (0.081) (0.099) (0.10) (0.16) (0.20)
Network Size Decrease (10 p.p.) 1.62*** 1.33*** 1.78*** 1.55*** 2.61*** 2.76***
Marginal Probability 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.13
(0.071) (0.076) (0.14) (0.13) (0.27) (0.46)
Increase in Plan Quality 0.26*** 0.46*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.46*** 0.34***
Marginal Probability -0.15 -0.10 -0.11 -0.15 -0.09 -0.13
(0.024) (0.074) (0.064) (0.058) (0.094) (0.12)
No Change in Plan Quality 0.55*** 1.02 0.64*** 0.50*** 0.68** 0.52***
Marginal Probability -0.07 0.003 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08
(0.047) (0.15) (0.089) (0.077) (0.10) (0.13)
Change in Deductible 0.93*** 1.02 0.95** 0.97** 0.91** 0.92**
($100) (0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.013) (0.037) (0.030)
Change in Maximum OOP 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.07***
($100) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.025) (0.024)
Changes, Choice Set Mean Characteristics, 2016-17
Change, Choice Set Size 1.05*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.02* 1.00 0.99
(0.0063) (0.0093) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.024)
Percent Change, Premium 1.09*** 0.96*** 1.09*** 0.90*** 1.09*** 0.96**
(0.0048) (0.0055) (0.012) (0.0086) (0.013) (0.021)
Change, Average Network Size 1.01 1.03 0.73*** 0.89 0.88 1.29
(10 p.p.) (0.066) (0.092) (0.082) (0.11) (0.14) (0.31)
Change, High Quality Share 13.5*** 14.7*** 1.52 4.17** 0.045*** 0.13
(5.18) (7.85) (1.00) (2.99) (0.038) (0.18)
Change, Medium Quality Share 10.1*** 46.5*** 0.13*** 1.28 0.019*** 0.12
(3.68) (24.2) (0.087) (0.92) (0.016) (0.16)
Change, No Quality Share 0.39*** 0.49** 0.68 1.40 0.40* 1.15
(0.089) (0.15) (0.27) (0.63) (0.22) (0.97)
Attributes of Chosen Plan, 2016
Total Premium ($100) 0.998* 1.000 0.998 0.999*** 1.004* 1.002*
(0.00085) (0.00027) (0.0013) (0.00042) (0.0020) (0.0012)
Network Size 0.64*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.55*** 0.56***
(% of Physicians) (0.021) (0.033) (0.042) (0.050) (0.040) (0.065)
Bronze Plan 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.45***
(0.021) (0.13) (0.019) (0.056) (0.022) (0.10)
Silver Plan 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.47*** 0.45***
(0.015) (0.034) (0.024) (0.029) (0.041) (0.068)
HMO Plan 0.45*** 1.13 0.63*** 0.61** 0.44*** 0.40***
(0.042) (0.18) (0.099) (0.12) (0.075) (0.12)
Deductible ($100) 1.017*** 1.007*** 1.017*** 1.010*** 1.019*** 1.012***
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Maximum OOP ($100) 1.006 1.002 0.999 0.995 1.006 0.983***
(0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0048) (0.0035) (0.0065) (0.0058)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 6 (Continued): Plan Switching Decision
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Odds Ratios (unless noted) Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Choice Set Mean Characteristics, 2016
Choice Set Size 1.001 0.996 1.014** 1.007 1.036*** 1.017
(0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0073) (0.012)
Average Premium ($100) 1.008*** 1.001 1.001 0.999 0.986*** 0.998*
(0.00077) (0.00064) (0.0012) (0.00070) (0.0022) (0.0013)
Average Network Size 1.09 0.91 0.73*** 0.95 0.88 1.13
(0.066) (0.074) (0.078) (0.11) (0.12) (0.24)
High Quality Share 1.93*** 0.76 6.70*** 7.65*** 5.04*** 4.75***
(0.26) (0.14) (1.64) (2.01) (1.69) (2.50)
Medium Quality Share 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.25*** 0.41* 0.74 1.49
(0.054) (0.063) (0.093) (0.20) (0.35) (1.14)
No Quality Share 0.20*** 0.12*** 2.70** 1.96 0.90 1.66
(0.042) (0.031) (1.06) (0.82) (0.48) (1.38)
Person Level Characteristics
Age (Head of Household) 1.004** 1.000 1.000 1.002** 1.024*** 1.001
(0.0015) (0.00070) (0.0025) (0.00082) (0.0031) (0.0014)
Self-Enrollment 0.97** 0.88*** 1.00 0.93** 1.10*** 1.04
(0.013) (0.017) (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.051)
New Enrollee (in 2016) 0.87*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.97 0.91*** 0.84***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.044)
Constant 1.09 1.35 0.18*** 1.02 0.033*** 1.91
(0.32) (0.78) (0.083) (0.58) (0.020) (1.87)
Observations 235,868 115,752 59,254 44,853 37,463 13,273
Reference categories: gold/platinum plans, PPO plans, low quality plans, decrease in plan quality
Insurer brand fixed effects included and robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: Types of Plan Switching
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Marginal Probabilities Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Outcome: Switch Insurers
Change in Premium 0.063*** 0.100*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.036***
(10%) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Network Size Decrease 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.011 0.0095 0.020** 0.030**
(10 p.p.) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Increase in Plan Quality -0.066*** -0.076*** -0.060*** -0.089*** -0.045*** -0.051**
(0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.023)
Outcome: Switch Metal Tiers
Change in Premium 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.046***
(10%) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Network Size Decrease 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.0003 0.0004 0.023
(10 p.p.) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019)
Increase in Plan Quality 0.021*** -0.005 0.013 -0.025 0.030 0.012
(0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.042)
Outcome: Switch Plan Type
Change in Premium 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.064*** 0.048***
(10%) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Network Size Decrease 0.045*** 0.018** 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.040***
(10 p.p.) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
Increase in Plan Quality -0.10*** -0.21*** -0.085*** -0.16*** -0.076*** -0.084***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.029)
Observations 235,868 115,752 59,254 44,853 37,463 13,273
Reference category: Decrease in plan quality. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
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Table 8: Plan Switching Probabilities: Instrumented Premiums
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Marginal Probabilities Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Change in Premium 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08***
(10%) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Network Size Decrease 0.02*** 0.001 0.02** 0.004 0.05*** 0.06***
(10 p.p.) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.021)
Increase in Plan Quality -0.07*** 0.01 -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.11**
(0.010) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.044)
No Change in Plan Quality 0.00 0.11*** -0.01 -0.037 -0.01 -0.06*
(0.009) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.031)
Observations 235,868 115,752 59,254 44,853 37,463 13,273
Reference category: Decrease in plan quality. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Table 9: Plan Switching Probabilities: Non-Linear Premium and Network
Size Changes
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Marginal Probabilities Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
>20% Premium Increase 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.11***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023)
10-20% Premium Increase 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.08***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021)
<10% Premium Increase Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
10+ p.p. Network Size 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.02* 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.07**
Decrease (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.031)
0-10 p.p. Network Size 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.11*** 0.07***
Decrease (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.027)
Increase in Network Size Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Increase in Plan Quality -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.25*** -0.25***
(0.011) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.047)
No Change in Plan Quality -0.14*** -0.061*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.20***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031)
Observations 235,868 115,752 59,254 44,853 37,463 13,273
Reference category: Decrease in plan quality. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
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Chapter 4: The Welfare Impacts of
Provider Network Size and Plan Quality
Restrictions on Marketplace Health
Insurance Plans
Abstract
Policymakers have considered provider network adequacy and minimum plan
quality rating regulations in health insurance settings to promote adequate
access to care and plan standards for consumers. However, there is limited in-
formation about how such regulations may affect net consumer welfare. Using
plan valuations estimated from mixed logit plan choice models, I simulate the
expected effects of hypothetical network adequacy and plan quality rating re-
quirements on consumer welfare using data from the California, Colorado, and
Washington Marketplaces. I simulate the effects of network adequacy require-
ments (covering at minimum 10% and 20% of all regional physicians) and a
requirement for plans to have a quality rating exceeding two stars (out of five).
I find significant reductions in annual expected consumer surplus under mini-
mum network size requirements, with individuals facing reductions of 1-3% and
4-7% of net premiums under 10% and 20% minimum network size thresholds,
respectively. However, plan quality requirements have an ambiguous welfare
effect, with individuals facing expected welfare changes ranging from a 3% loss
to a 12% gain relative to net premiums. Policymakers should carefully consider
such regulations in light of their potential effects on consumer welfare.
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1 Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplaces/Exchanges have enrolled a large and
increasing share of American households since the initial enrollment period in 2014.
The Marketplaces were established to provide affordable and “high quality” insur-
ance for households shopping on the individual marketplace. They primarily rely
on consumer choice, product transparency, and (in some states) active negotiations
with insurers to deliver affordable plans. Policymakers have also introduced certain
plan requirements that regulate various aspects of Exchange-eligible health plans to
promote plan quality.
There are various ways of characterizing and measuring plan “quality.” Policy-
makers have considered provider network size and plan quality ratings (measured as
a combination of customer satisfaction and an assessment of care provided) as impor-
tant measures of plan quality in relatively choice-rich settings (e.g. for Medicare Part
D prescription drug plans and Medicaid Managed Care plans). Minimum thresholds
have been considered or set for these plan attributes in different contexts as a way to
ensure adequate standards of care and access to care for enrollees.
At the outset, the ACA required Marketplace plans to have provider networks
that included 20% of “essential community providers,” and that services should be ac-
cessible to enrollees without “unreasonable” delay (Baicker and Levy, 2015). Similar
definitions adopted by state Medicaid managed care programs involve requirements
such as having access to a reasonable share of local primary care providers and rea-
sonable travel distance to nearest providers (Ndumele et al., 2018).
Similarly, minimum plan quality requirements have been implemented among
Medicare Part D and Medicare managed care plans. In these settings, low-perform
plans (with plan quality ratings of two stars or less out of five) are flagged with a
“low-performing indicator” to consumers and are removed altogether if they retain
such low quality over 2 years (Reid et al., 2013). Insurers affected by these regulations
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would be incentivized to react by implementing changes to increase their plan quality
or by removing the plans from the respective platforms.
Previous research has established that consumers have significantly positive
valuations for network size and plan quality ratings in various health insurance ex-
change settings (Ericson and Starc, 2015; DeLeire et al., 2017; Du, 2018). Prior
research also suggests that welfare losses due to the removal of plans from consumer
choice sets may be tempered when combined with the removal of some aspect of
plan differentiation among remaining plans (Lucarelli et al., 2012). Furthermore,
insurers may promote adverse selection by selecting on enrollees using the targeted
construction of provider networks or taking advantage of specific plan quality poli-
cies (Decarolis et al., 2017; McGuire et al., 2014). However, it remains unclear how
net consumer welfare would change under policy scenarios that specifically regulate
provider network size and plan quality ratings (to promote plan quality and access)
when balanced with potential cost increases to consumers.
This study simulates the effects of potential network adequacy requirements
and plan quality restrictions on expected consumer surplus using data from the Cal-
ifornia, Colorado, and Washington Marketplaces. First, I simulate the effect of two
minimum network size thresholds, consisting of 10% and 20% minimum network size
thresholds (which would affect about 33% and 50% of chosen plans, respectively).
Then, I simulate a minimum quality restriction requiring plans to have a plan quality
star rating that exceeds two stars (out of five). I use mixed logit models of plan
choice to derive consumer valuations of plan attributes used to calculate changes in
expected welfare under the different policy scenarios.
I find significant reductions in expected consumer surplus when minimum net-
work thresholds are put into place. Individuals across income levels face welfare
reductions of $30-45 (1-3% of net premiums) and $115-205 (4-7% of net premiums)
under 10% and 20% minimum network size thresholds, respectively. In contrast, the
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effects of minimum plan quality ratings seem to be more ambiguous. Individuals
across income categories face changes in annual expected welfare ranging from -$90
to $509 (from a 3% loss to a 12% gain relative to net premiums) under a minimum
quality threshold above two stars, with considerable variation in both gains and losses
in expected welfare across income and household size categories. Under both policy
simulations, there is significant variation in the impact of the policies on consumer
welfare due to the variations in the valuations of plan attributes and plan availability
across households.
This paper is one of few to estimate consumer valuations of plan attributes
in the ACA setting using individual level enrollment data. Moreover, this is the
first study (to my knowledge) which explores how specific adequacy policies affecting
provider network and plan quality minimum requirements could impact expected
consumer welfare in the choice-rich ACA Marketplace setting. These results are also
generalizable to other settings with insurance choice where such policies are in effect
or considered, as there are currently only a limited number of studies on these policy
welfare questions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the study
data and methods. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 discusses the results and
potential implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
The analyses of health plan choice use individual-level enrollment data for 2016 from
the from California, Washington, and Colorado Marketplaces along with additional
data on plan characteristics from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health In-
surance Exchange (HIX) Compare and provider network data from Vericred. The
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state enrollment data files include plans selected by each enrollees along with basic
demographics, income levels, and other household information necessary to calculate
net premiums. These individual-level data are then collapsed to the household level
to examine household plan choice. The three states represent a large share of total
Marketplace enrollees (16% in 2016).
The final analytic file for this paper is constructed by merging these three
data sets (i.e., Exchange, RWJF HIX and Vericred) at the region-county level for
each state along with some additional plan and insurer information, notably plan
star ratings from California and Colorado.1 The final sample has information from
1,301,841 households (1,061,153 from California, 99,098 from Colorado, and 141,590
from Washington). The share of enrolling households with income under 250% FPL,
250-400% FPL, and over 400% FPL are 68%, 20%, and 12%, respectively.
Plan Attributes
They key plan attributes are network size and plan quality. The relative valuation
of net premium is also important in serving both as an important control and in
forming the basis for constructing valuations for network size and plan quality to then
calculate changes in expected consumer surplus under alternative choice sets. The net
household premium measure is calculated as the household’s total annual premium
for each plan minus that household’s tax credit (based on the second-cheapest silver
plan in the region). The models also include controls for additional plan attributes,
including: indicators for metal tiers, indicators for the cheapest available plan in
each metal tier, plan type (HMO/PPO), deductible, maximum out-of-pocket (OOP),
coinsurance/copay (for inpatient physician services, outpatient facilities, and primary
care), and insurer brand fixed effects (FE). These controls are presented in Appendix
1The reason why the merge is done for each county-region as opposed to the rating region level
is because not all SBM plans offered in a region are offered in each county within that region, if a
region spans multiple counties in a state.
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Table A1 with a full set of regression results.
Provider network size for a given plan is measured as the proportion of physi-
cians in an area covered by that plan.2 To calculate the provider network size for each
plan, I calculate the number of physicians in the rating region within the provider
network and divide it by the total number of physicians within the counties of the
respective rating region where that plan is actually sold (rather than the entire rating
area). I create physician network measures for each plan in the subset (if applicable)
of counties in each rating region that the plan is offered in, as not all plans sold in
each region are offered in each county within that region.
I create a quality measure based on four categories: low quality (1-2 stars),
medium quality (3 stars), and high quality (4-5 stars), and “no quality.” A continuous
plan quality measure from 1-5 stars cannot be constructed because 23% of plans have
“no quality” as their plan quality rating. These cutoffs in the plan quality variable
are selected to roughly delineate the plan choices in three similarly sized categories
among plans with available quality ratings. While quality ratings are generally given
at the insurer level, some insurers have different quality ratings pertaining to different
plan types.3 Refer to Du (2018) for more information how the plan quality ratings
are constructed by the state Health Benefits Exchanges.
2.2 Methods and Approach
Mixed Logit Models
I use mixed logit models of plan choice to estimate enrollee valuations of different
plan attributes (notably provider network size and plan quality). These are in turn
used to estimate the changes in expected consumer surplus due to different policy
2This distinction is made because not all plans sold in a state rating region is sold in every county
within that rating region.
3Some insurers may only have quality ratings for one type of plan but not another (e.g. for their
HMOs but not their PPOs).
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scenarios. The empirical model is based on the random utility model used to derive
conditional, multinomial, and mixed logit models (McFadden, 1973; Train, 2009).
This overall structure has been utilized by several other plan choice studies (Sen and
DeLeire, 2018; Tebaldi, 2017). The mixed logit also relaxes IIA assumptions and
estimates a distribution around the relevant coefficients, allowing one to observe a
range of valuations for plan attributes of interest. The mixed logit specification in
the context of plan attribute valuations is:
Logit(Plani) = f(X
′
n,i(b̃n,i + βn), X
′
m,iβm, S, B, εi) (1)
where X is a vector of observable plan attributes (e.g. plan quality, premium), S is
a set of enrollee fixed effects (included in the mixed logit model by definition), and
B is a set of insurer brand fixed effects. i is an enrollee index (and thus a choice
set index as well), n indexes the subset of plan attributes X which are modeled with
random coefficients (premium, network size, and plan quality) and m indexes the
remaining plan attributes which are modeled without random effects. Indices for
each plan are omitted for concision. For the variables with random coefficients, b̃n,i
(normally distributed around 0) are values from the vector b̃ representing the enrollee-
level deviations from the relevant overall coefficients estimated for the sample. These
estimates allow for heterogeneity in the valuation of provider network size and plan
quality for the simulated changes in welfare.
Simulations
Next, I explore how expected consumer welfare might change due to: 1) network
adequacy requirements and 2) minimum quality restrictions. First, I simulate the
effect of two minimum network size thresholds: 10% and 20% minimum provider
network size thresholds. Then, I simulate a minimum quality restriction requiring
plans to have a quality rating that exceeds two stars.
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The simulations use the results from the mixed logit models to calculate
changes in expected consumer welfare due to the aforementioned policies using the
logsum approach (Small and Rosen, 1981). After estimating the mixed logit models
on the actual choice sets observed in the data, I change the choice set faced by the
consumer to reflect the new requirements for each simulated policy change (to be
explained shortly). The expected consumer surplus (CS) of plan j to consumer i can









































where C is an unknown constant because an absolute utility level cannot be measured.
This equation provides the expected consumer surplus of the choice set. The change
in expected consumer welfare due to a change from an old choice set to a new choice
set (with respective superscripts A and B) that a consumer faces can be written as:
4As stated in Chapter 2, the utility Uij can be additively decomposed into a systematic component




















where the constant C is differenced out in this expression. Subtracting the expected
consumer surplus of B from A generates the change in consumer welfare in dollar
terms. This method of simulation is motivated by studies exploring the effects of tax
credits and the availability of new insurance plans on plan choice (Pauly and Herring,
2000, 2002).
Note that this method calculates the expected consumer surplus of enrollees
at the stage of decision-making, before any realized health care utilization and costs.
This quantifies the change in expected consumer surplus due to how well-matched
the set of plan choices are to the health insurance preferences of the consumers.5
To create the counterfactual choice sets, I first increase the respective attribute
of plans affected by the policy requirement to the minimum threshold (e.g. increasing
plans with network sizes below 10% to a 10% network size). To calculate the increase
in plan premium for affected plans, I run the following model on the unadjusted,
standardized annual premium:
Premi,j = β1Net. Sizei,j + β2(Med. Quality)i,j + β3(Hi Quality)i,j + Γi,j + εi,j (7)
where i, j are subscripts for each plan and state-rating region combination and Γ is
a vector of other plan attribute controls, including an indicator for having no plan
quality, insurer brand fixed effects, other financial and plan type attributes. The
coefficients of interest are β1 for network size and β2 for plan quality, which are used
to make adjustments to the premiums of plans affected by the respective policies.6
5For instance, enrollees who have a very high aversion to plan premium and a very low valuation
of provider network size might be worse off under network adequacy restrictions because the choice
set they face, from which they choose their plans, would potentially be less well-aligned to the
insurance preferences of the enrollee.
6β2 is the additional premium associated with a medium quality plan (3 stars) relative to a low
quality plan (1-2 stars).
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For network size, I calculate the semi-elasticity of the network size coefficient
(β1) to find the percentage change in premium for each 10 percentage point change in
plan network size and scale the premiums of affected plans proportional to the amount
that the plan network size must be increased (in p.p. terms) to meet the minimum
network threshold in question. I perform the analogous calculations for quality by
bumping up low quality plans (≤ 2 stars) to 3 stars (as medium quality plans). I
then scale the premiums of plans affected by the minimum quality threshold using
β2, which is the coefficient representing an additional premium amount for medium
quality plans relative to low quality plans.
The increases in the individual standardized premiums are then transformed
into the corresponding total premiums faced for each household by adjusting for
the relevant information for each enrolling household (age, household size, APTC
amount, etc.).7 Thus, the only difference in the counterfactual choice sets will be the
changes in the network size or quality and in the premiums of the affected plans. This
parsimonious approach assumes that all changes on the supply side will be reflected
in the increase in plan premiums for affected plans.
2.3 Limitations
A key limitation of the simulation approach is that the study does not directly model
the insurer response to potential network adequacy or plan quality requirements. I
assume that insurers will not remove affected plans from the Marketplace, but will
instead raise the network size or quality rating of the affected plans to the required
threshold and increase the premiums for the affected plans to reflect the necessary
cost of meeting the respective policy requirement. The precision of the estimates
7I find that a 10 percentage point increase in provider network size and an increase from low
quality (≤ 2 stars) to medium quality (3 stars) are respectively associated with $70 and $157
increases in the unadjusted, standardized annual premium for an individual at age 27. From a semi-
elasticity perspective, a 10 percentage point change in provider network size is associated with a
2.2% increase in the unadjusted plan premium. These estimates are used to scale up the premiums
of affected plans faced by each household.
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from these simulations are limited by the fact that they do not directly attempt to
model the insurer’s supply-side changes and responses to the network size or quality
requirements. Thus, these estimates are more general “ballpark” estimates on how
such requirements might affect expected consumer surplus.
The results of the paper may be limited in generalizability to the ACA Market-
places as a whole as the data consists of only three states (CA, CO, WA). Consumers
in these three states have more plans and insurers to choose from compared to the
nationwide average. However, these states covered about one sixth of all ACA en-
rollees in 2016. Given the relatively good “health” of the Marketplaces in the three
states in having several plans and insurers for enrollees to choose from, the results




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for chosen plans and all plans faced by enrollees
living in California, Colorado, and Washington who selected an Marketplace plan in
2016. Consumers tend to enroll in higher quality plans relative to the distribution
of plan quality across choice sets. Meanwhile, the average network size of chosen
plans and all plans are similar. Given that almost 70% of enrollees have income levels
under 250% FPL (previously mentioned), it makes sense that average net annual
premiums (after APTC) tend to be significantly lower than total (pre-APTC) annual
premiums and that consumers are disproportionately more likely to enroll into Silver
plans (where cost-sharing reductions are applied), relative to plans in other metal
tiers.
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3.2 Mixed Logit Plan Attribute Valuations
Table 2 presents the results of the main mixed logit models of plan choice on the full
sample of three states.8 These are the results used to inform consumer valuations for
the network adequacy restriction simulations. I focus on the coefficients on premium
and network size (as odds ratios) shown in Table 2, while the full regression results
for this specification and sample are shown in Appendix Table A1. We can see
that enrollees across the different stratifications are quite responsive to premium
and network size. Controlling for other factors, individual enrollees across income
categories exhibited 0.84-0.90 times the odds of choosing a plan for a $100 increase
in annual premium (p < 0.001) and 1.2-1.3 times higher odds of choosing a plan for
10 p.p. increase in network size (p < 0.001). The distribution of the enrollee-level
coefficients for net premium and network size are shown in the bottom half of Table
2. There is considerable variation in the responsiveness to premium and network size,
particularly for relatively lower income individuals.
Table 3 presents the results of the mixed logit models with plan quality (for
California and Colorado) and are used to inform the consumer valuations for the
minimum quality requirement simulations. The results also include (not shown) the
control variables shown in Table A1 (with the exception of insurer brand fixed effects).
Enrollee valuations of premium and network size are quite significant in the expected
directions and fairly similar in magnitude to those shown in Table 2. Across all
stratifications, enrollees are significantly more likely to pick high quality plans and
medium quality plans relative to low quality plans. All else equal, individual enrollees
have 5.2-5.5 and 1.3-2.1 times higher odds of choosing high quality and medium
plans, respectively, relative to low quality plans. Like the case with network size and
premium seen in Table 2, there is also considerable variation in the responsiveness to
8Note that plan quality is not included because Washington did not have plan quality ratings in
2016.
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plan quality in this sample, as seen in the bottom half of Table 3.
3.3 Minimum Provider Network Size Simulations
Table 4 shows the results of the simulation of a 10% and 20% network adequacy
requirement on the change in expected consumer surplus. Enrollees face significant
reductions in expected consumer welfare when minimum network adequacies are put
into place. Individuals across income levels face welfare reductions of $30-45 (1-3% of
net premiums) and $115-205 (4-7% of net premiums) under 10% and 20% minimum
network size thresholds, respectively. There is considerable variable in the magnitude
of the expected welfare loss. For example, individual enrollees at 250-400% FPL faced
expected welfare changes between the 10th and 90th percentiles ranging from -$66 to
$1 for the 10% requirement and -$204 to $9 for the 20% requirement.
3.4 Plan Quality Restriction Simulations
The effects of the minimum quality requirement (that plans must exceed 2 stars) are
shown in Table 5. In contrast to the network adequacy results, the effects of minimum
plan quality ratings on expected consumer welfare seems to be more ambiguous.
Individuals across income groups face changes in expected welfare ranging from -$90
to $509 (from a 3% loss to a 12% gain relative to net premiums). Moreover, there is
sizable variation within income and household size categories, with individuals 250-
400% FPL facing an expected welfare change ranging from -$383 to $171 between the
10th and 90th percentiles.
4 Discussion
This study examined the expected welfare implications of potential network ade-
quacy requirements and plan quality restrictions for ACA Marketplace plans. Using
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mixed logit plan choice models on data from the California, Colorado, and Washing-
ton Health Benefits Exchanges, I found that enrollees were quite responsive to plan
quality, provider network size, and plan premium, in line with findings from studies
in related plan choice settings such as the Massachusetts Connector and Medicare
managed care plans (Reid et al., 2013; Ericson and Starc, 2015).
Using the estimated plan attribute valuations, I found that average expected
consumer surplus was reduced under network adequacy restrictions for each of the
six household/income groups, with a larger reduction in expected consumer surplus
corresponding to the more stringent 20% network size requirement. There is consider-
able variation in the reduction of expected consumer surplus across different enrollees.
But overall, given that enrollees tend to prefer both lower premiums and larger net-
work sizes, the results suggest that network adequacy restrictions may lead to a lower
expected consumer surplus for most enrollees by reducing the possibility of choosing
cheaper, narrow network plans.
In contrast, the effects of minimum plan quality ratings on expected consumer
welfare seems to be more ambiguous. When plans are required to exceed 2 stars
(low quality threshold), there is considerable variation in both losses and gains in
expected consumer welfare across income groups and between individual and family
households. The larger variation in expected welfare changes can partly be explained
by two differences, relative to network size. First, enrollees exhibited larger variation
in their valuations of plan quality relative to network size. Second, the distribution
of plan quality across state rating regions was relatively more variable than that of
network size. Overall, these results suggest that the implementation of minimum plan
quality requirements may have a more ambiguous, heterogeneous effect on consumer
surplus compared to the more consistent effects of network adequacy requirements.
The welfare implications of the stylized network adequacy restrictions relate to
the fundamental idea that there is a trade-off between access to care and costs. Thus,
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policymakers will need to balance the need for both in order to both foster competition
between providers and insurers (to reduce premiums) and to ensure proper access to
care (Baicker and Levy, 2015).
Broad networks are beneficial to consumers primarily with respect to access
to care and in facilitating a greater choice of physicians and hospitals. However,
narrow networks could benefit enrollees in a couple of ways, chiefly through insurer-
provider negotiations which allow insurers to further compete on premiums. Provider
networks give insurers leverage in their negotiations with providers over reimburse-
ment rates, by offering higher patient volume in return for lower reimbursement rates.
The insurer bargaining power relative to physician groups (and hospitals) can help
keep prices lower for enrollees especially in the competitive, price-transparent ACA
Marketplace context (Howard, 2014). This is particularly true as providers have con-
solidated into larger health systems in recent years. As a result, the creation of more
exclusive narrow networks has been one of the most effective ways for insurers to
maintain leverage over reimbursement rates (and pass some of the savings on to con-
sumers). Network adequacy restrictions could curtail insurers abilities to negotiate
with providers, thereby restricting the ability to compete on premium for enrollees
(Baicker and Levy, 2015). Again, while the causal mechanisms are beyond the scope
of this study’s simulations, the savings to consumers could also be reflected by the
fact that insurers could help direct patients to high-value providers, especially as in-
surers have recently become more involved in the delivery of care, encouragement of
providers to adopt best practices, and cost-effectiveness of care to compete on price
(Howard, 2014).
At the same time, there are key drawbacks and adverse outcomes that may
result from insurers restricting networks. Insurers could tailor the construction of
narrow networks to “cream skim” from the risk pool and discourage the enrollment
of sicker enrollees. Insurers creating narrow networks may seek to exclude or limit
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access to specialized health care providers to deter high-risk enrollees from their plans,
driving up overall costs in the Marketplaces by exacerbating adverse selection in the
market.
Taken together with the pricing and bargaining mechanisms that affect insurer
and plan provider networks, the results of the study suggest that policymakers should
at minimum be cautious in their implementation of network adequacy requirements
and should consider how to best balance cost and affordability among enrollees and
the target population. This may require “better” ways of measuring network adequacy
and communicating this information to enrollees in order to inform their decisions.
The welfare implications for plan quality restrictions are harder to contextu-
alize, partly due to the fact that such ratings are much less commonly utilized in
other insurance contexts. Even among ACA Marketplaces, only a few state-based
marketplace (SBM) states have implemented plan quality ratings for enrollees. The
most similar setting would be for Medicare Part D PDPs and Medicare Advantage
managed care plans, which utilize a plan quality restriction that the simulation in
this paper is based on.
However, the economic implications of plan quality restrictions are also less
clear from a theoretical perspective relative to those of network adequacy require-
ments. The effects of these policies on welfare ultimately depend on how costly it is
for firms to raise their plan quality ratings, and thus how much their prices increase for
affected consumers. Policymakers interested in establishing plan quality thresholds
in the ACA context should account for the wide variation in plan quality valuations
and the potential for changes in these valuations over time as consumers “learn” with
respect to how reliable quality ratings are as a signal of actual plan quality (more
generally speaking).
As previously mentioned, the study has a few notable limitations. Importantly,
insurer response to various policies is assumed rather than modeled, specifically in
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their decisions not to remove affected plans from the Marketplace. In addition, I
use the association between premium and the non-financial attributes to infer the
potential costs to insurers of improving plans along those dimensions. This method
has been used in other studies such as Dafny et al. (2017), but is limited in terms
of explaining the mechanisms which generate the estimates obtained. The precision
of the estimates from these simulations is limited by these two key factors, and thus
serve more as ballpark estimates on how such requirements might affect expected
consumer surplus.
Furthermore, the welfare implications might be limited in their generalizabil-
ity to enrollees nationwide as the data are from three states (CA, CO, WA) that
have fairly competitive Marketplaces. Nonetheless, the results from this sample are
useful in exploring consumer dynamics and welfare changes under settings with more
“healthy” Marketplaces as intended under the ACA.
Despite the limitations, this paper makes key contributions to the literature.
This study is one of few to estimate consumer valuations of plan attributes in the
ACA setting using precise enrollee-level enrollment files. Moreover, this is the first
study (to my knowledge) which explores how specific regulations affecting provider
networks and plan quality could impact expected consumer welfare in the choice-rich
ACA Marketplace environment.
5 Conclusion
Provider network adequacy requirements may reduce consumer welfare by effecting
increases in plan costs, thereby limiting the set of affordable plans that a sizable share
of enrollees may prefer. On the other hand, the effects of minimum quality restrictions
are more ambiguous and heterogeneous with respect to consumer welfare among ACA
enrollees. In addition, enrollees are quite responsive to both provider network size and
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plan quality. Policymakers should be thoughtful in considering the implementation
of potential network adequacy or plan quality threshold requirements. Policymakers
should evaluate the tradeoffs between plan affordability and access to care/other plan
benefits and also take into account potential unintended consequences that may pan
out in the interplay between consumers, insurers, and providers.
Ultimately, this study provides an initial overview of the welfare implications
of policies affecting provider networks and plan quality in the context of the ACA
Marketplaces. Enrollee-level SBM enrollment data and detailed plan-level data have
become increasingly available. There remains a significant gap in the literature that
can be addressed by estimating structural models of supply and demand in order to
provide insight on the causal mechanisms behind shifts in consumer welfare vis-à-vis
policies affecting non-financial plan attributes.
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Tables
Table 1: Plan Summary Statistics
N = 46,426,138 Chosen Plans All Plans
Plan Network Attributes Mean SD Mean SD
Network Size (% of Physicians) 20% 0.12 21% 0.14
PPO 44% 0.50 35% 0.48
HMO/EPO 56% 0.50 65% 0.48
Plan Quality Ratings*
High Quality (≥4 Stars) 30% 0.46 24% 0.43
Middle Quality (3 stars) 28% 0.45 22% 0.41
Low Quality (≤2 Stars) 28% 0.45 31% 0.46
No Quality 14% 0.35 23% 0.42
Financial Attributes
Total Premium, Individual $4,994 2,423 $5,531 2,941
Net Premium, Individual $2,137 1,888 $3,100 2,280
Total Premium, Family $11,094 4,505 $12,362 5,612
Net Premium, Family $3,979 3,904 $6,099 4,735
Bronze 28% 0.45 31% 0.46
Silver 62% 0.49 30% 0.46
Gold 5% 0.22 23% 0.42
Platinum 3% 0.18 14% 0.35
Catastrophic** 1% 0.12 3% 0.16
*All plan quality rating variables only for CA, CO (N= 35,562,421)
**Catastrophic Plans only shown when available to family
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Table 2: Plan Choice Mixed Logit Results
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Net Premium 0.836*** 0.887*** 0.907*** 0.952*** 0.895*** 0.967***
($100) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Network Size 1.25*** 1.37*** 1.18*** 1.32*** 1.25*** 1.24***
(10 p.p.) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018)
Premium Coefficient Distribution (Percentiles)
10th 0.776 0.854 0.876 0.938 0.851 0.960
25th 0.800 0.870 0.883 0.941 0.861 0.962
Median 0.825 0.881 0.898 0.949 0.882 0.966
75th 0.854 0.898 0.921 0.958 0.913 0.971
90th 0.891 0.921 0.943 0.968 0.945 0.977
Network Size Coefficient Distribution (Percentiles)
10th 1.178 1.113 1.089 1.174 1.237 1.239
25th 1.223 1.224 1.136 1.231 1.242 1.240
Median 1.277 1.359 1.198 1.319 1.246 1.241
75th 1.357 1.594 1.283 1.438 1.252 1.241
90th 1.457 1.769 1.380 1.548 1.257 1.242
Observations 22,540,279 8,510,218 5,532,135 3,379,746 4,709,913 1,752,288
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3: Plan Choice Mixed Logit Results with Plan Quality (CA, CO)
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Net Premium 0.837*** 0.885*** 0.911*** 0.953*** 0.892*** 0.962***
($100) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Network Size 1.16*** 1.16*** 1.24*** 1.26*** 1.20*** 1.15***
(10 p.p.) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
High Quality 5.16*** 7.72*** 5.46*** 5.64*** 5.23*** 3.40***
(0.058) (0.198) (0.136) (0.182) (0.213) (0.232)
Med. Quality 1.34*** 2.91*** 2.05*** 2.57*** 1.21*** 1.44***
(0.037) (0.138) (0.101) (0.155) (0.058) (0.094)
Low Quality Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
No Quality 1.38*** 2.30*** 0.76*** 0.84 0.95 1.02
(0.014) (0.039) (0.044) (0.106) (0.085) (0.107)
High Quality Plan Coefficient Distribution (Percentiles)
10th 5.147 6.819 5.461 5.634 3.163 1.028
25th 5.151 7.185 5.463 5.639 3.862 1.543
Median 5.156 7.500 5.464 5.644 4.368 2.108
75th 5.161 8.055 5.465 5.650 7.523 8.868
90th 5.166 9.324 5.466 5.654 9.439 14.423
Medium Quality Plan Coefficient Distribution (Percentiles)
10th 1.306 2.450 2.009 2.230 1.196 1.435
25th 1.319 2.593 2.023 2.306 1.200 1.435
Median 1.334 2.766 2.039 2.405 1.205 1.436
75th 1.363 3.414 2.068 3.061 1.210 1.436
90th 1.396 3.779 2.114 3.309 1.214 1.436
Observations 17,204,833 6,739,699 3,670,070 2,565,314 3,865,754 1,412,883
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4: Changes in Consumer Surplus, Network Adequacy Restrictions
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
10% Threshold Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Mean -$45 -$100 -$31 -$71 -$35 -$64
10 Percentile -$91 -$202 -$66 -$178 -$47 -$146
25 Percentile -$44 -$98 -$29 -$86 -$23 -$76
Median -$11 -$21 -$3 -$17 -$8 -$34
75 Percentile $0 $0 $0 $0 -$1 -$5
90 Percentile $0 $3 $1 $0 $0 $0
20% Threshold
Mean -$115 -$211 -$123 -$266 -$204 -$272
10 Percentile -$204 -$482 -$204 -$536 -$165 -$447
25 Percentile -$97 -$181 -$85 -$293 -$88 -$297
Median -$42 -$69 -$25 -$124 -$48 -$188
75 Percentile -$10 -$2 $0 -$31 -$15 -$58
90 Percentile $0 $30 $9 $0 $0 -$9
Table 5: Changes in Consumer Surplus, Minimum Quality Threshold
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Mean $184 -$41 -$90 -$477 $509 $925
10 Percentile $20 -$435 -$383 -$1,177 $90 -$33
25 Percentile $63 -$269 -$198 -$779 $188 $251
Median $139 -$93 -$49 -$426 $343 $742
75 Percentile $243 $195 $49 -$117 $516 $1,238
90 Percentile $369 $453 $171 $166 $809 $1,920
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Appendix
Table A1: Plan Choice Mixed Logit Model Full Results
Under 250% FPL 250-400% FPL Over 400% FPL
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Net Premium 0.836*** 0.887*** 0.907*** 0.952*** 0.895*** 0.967***
($100) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0013)
Network Size 1.26*** 1.37*** 1.18*** 1.32*** 1.24*** 1.24***
(10 p.p.) (0.0053) (0.0096) (0.0101) (0.0126) (0.0108) (0.0162)
Silver 2.611*** 2.754*** 2.512*** 2.656*** 1.89*** 2.396***
(0.0392) (0.0780) (0.0701) (0.0913) (0.0602) (0.1262)
Gold 1.488*** 1.35*** 1.603*** 1.567*** 0.986 1.147***
(0.0126) (0.0168) (0.0328) (0.0360) (0.0305) (0.0536)
Platinum 1.135*** 1.187*** 1.412*** 1.217*** 0.763*** 0.880*
(0.0365) (0.0578) (0.0552) (0.0555) (0.0354) (0.0603)
Cheapest Bronze Plan 5.819*** 5.67*** 0.842*** 0.988 1.904*** 0.989
(0.3089) (0.5100) (0.0409) (0.0602) (0.1062) (0.0821)
Cheapest Silver Plan 1.56*** 2.784*** 0.200*** 0.229*** 1.697*** 0.578***
(0.0820) (0.2606) (0.0152) (0.0219) (0.1541) (0.0787)
Cheapest Gold Plan 1.234*** 2.123*** 0.091*** 0.143*** 2.493*** 0.638***
(0.0667) (0.2024) (0.0100) (0.0192) (0.3234) (0.1254)
HMO 0.393*** 0.386*** 0.465*** 0.400*** 0.454*** 0.390***
(0.0055) (0.0091) (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.01317) (0.0184)
Deductible 0.996*** 0.994*** 0.973*** 0.983*** 0.995*** 0.991***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.00124) (0.0009)
Maximum OOP 0.989*** 0.989*** 0.989*** 0.994*** 0.996*** 0.999
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0012)
Inpatient Physician
Low Copay 1.166*** 1.279** 0.944 1.343*** 0.568*** 0.57***
(0.0625) (0.1457) (0.0862) (0.1504) (0.0346) (0.0489)
High Copay 1.379*** 1.153*** 1.266*** 1.423*** 0.696*** 0.955
(0.0168) (0.0245) (0.0597) (0.0789) (0.0271) (0.0591)
High Coinsurance 0.787*** 0.876** 0.624*** 0.79*** 0.624*** 0.761***
(0.0248) (0.0460) (0.0234) (0.0328) (0.0213) (0.0380)
Outpatient Facility
Low Copay 0.591*** 0.456*** 0.72*** 0.517*** 1.059 1.033
(0.0305) (0.0498) (0.0648) (0.0571) (0.0629) (0.0858)
High Copay 0.644*** 0.557*** 1.265*** 1.129* 1.183*** 1.218***
(0.0259) (0.0397) (0.0721) (0.0810) (0.0667) (0.1178)
High Coinsurance 0.921*** 0.831*** 2.032*** 1.637*** 1.538*** 1.356***
(0.0386) (0.0535) (0.1045) (0.0968) (0.0857) (0.1224)
Primary Care
High Copay 0.469*** 0.370*** 0.308*** 0.348*** 0.753*** 0.607***
(0.0111) (0.0172) (0.0117) (0.0180) (0.0299) (0.0404)
Low Coinsurance 2.445*** 3.006*** 2.496*** 2.56*** 1.639*** 1.583***
(0.0360) (0.0853) (0.0819) (0.1144) (0.0551) (0.0793)
High Coinsurance 2.213*** 2.848*** 1.921*** 2.942*** 1.70*** 1.686***
(0.0358) (0.0920) (0.0524) (0.1233) (0.0354) (0.0647)
Insurer Brand FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 22,540,279 8,510,218 5,532,135 3,379,746 4,709,913 1,752,288
Reference categories: Bronze Plans, PPO Plans. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This dissertation explored three research questions related to consumer decision-
making in the Health Insurance Marketplace established by the ACA. The first and
second papers examined plan choice and plan switching decisions in the Marketplaces,
respectively. The third paper simulated the welfare impacts of hypothetical policies
affecting provider networks and plan quality ratings among Marketplace plans.
The first paper (Chapter 2) examined how enrollees value plan attributes (no-
tably provider network size and plan quality) on the ACA Marketplaces. I found that
consumers are quite responsive to network size and plan quality. Individual enrollees
exhibited an annual WTP of $200-300 for a 10 percentage-point (p.p.) (25 percentile)
increase in provider network size and a WTP of $1,200-2,800 for a high quality plan
(4-5 stars) relative to a low quality plan (1-2 stars). Additionally, consumers who
faced smaller choice sets or were newly enrolled tended to be even more responsive
to these non-financial plan attributes in their choice of plans.
The second paper (Chapter 3) examined how changes in the attributes of cho-
sen plans over time were associated with enrollee plan switching decisions in the
California Marketplace. I found that changes in the premium, provider network size,
and plan quality of chosen plans were significantly associated with the probability
that enrollees switched plans in the subsequent enrollment period. A plan’s 10 p.p.
decrease in network size was associated with a 5-13 p.p. increase in the probability
a returning enrollee switched plans on the Exchange, and an increase in plan quality
was associated with a 10-15 p.p. decrease in switching. Furthermore, enrollees who
were newly enrolled, older, or had assistance in enrollment displayed a lower likelihood
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of disenrolling from the Marketplace in the subsequent year.
The third paper (Chapter 4) simulated the expected effects of hypothetical
network adequacy and plan quality requirements on consumer welfare in the Mar-
ketplaces using mixed logit models of plan choice. I found that expected consumer
surplus would be significantly reduced under minimum network adequacy require-
ments. I found significant reductions in annual expected consumer surplus under
minimum network size requirements, with individuals facing reductions of 1-3% and
4-7% of net premiums under 10% and 20% minimum network size thresholds, respec-
tively. However, plan quality requirements had an ambiguous welfare effect, with
individuals facing expected welfare changes ranging from a 3% loss to a 12% gain
relative to net premiums.
The results from Papers 1 and 2 also suggest that policymakers should take
consumer responsiveness to provider network size and plan quality into account in
their efforts to facilitate consumer decision-making on the state Marketplaces. The
fact that enrollees strongly value plan quality ratings where provided suggests that
the implementation of plan quality ratings on the federally-facilitated marketplace
and other individual-market health exchanges could be useful to consumers in other
insurance exchange settings. They can provide consumers with useful, summarized
measures of plan quality that may otherwise be harder to assess. In addition, given
that consumers consistently value the breadth of provider networks, policymakers
may have a greater incentive to provide better, more understandable provider network
size information for Marketplace plans (such as categorical measures of network size).
It would be especially important to verify that the information provided for both
network size and plan quality are validated and accurate, given the level of consumer
responsiveness to these measures. Furthermore, consumer responsiveness to levels and
changes in plan quality and network size could inform insurers’ decisions to invest in
these attributes as another way of attracting enrollees to their plans and competing
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on the Marketplace.
Policymakers should also be thoughtful when considering the potential imple-
mentation of minimum requirements related to network adequacy or plan quality
ratings. Policymakers should evaluate the tradeoffs between affordability and access
to care (along with other plan benefits) to consumers and take into account the po-
tentially unintended consequences of policies and other changes to the Marketplace
platform vis-à-vis interactions between consumers, providers, and insurers.
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